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Capital structure literature suggests that firms are very likely to consider target leverage ratios 
when they issue new capital (Graham & Harvey, 2001). Albeit the dynamic trade-off theory 
predicts that firms have incentives to move toward achieving target debt ratios by reducing any 
deviation from those targets (Frank & Goyal, 2009), due to substantial financing frictions, that 
is issuance costs or intermediation costs, firms may decide to temporarily deviate from their 
target levels. A recent strand of research has investigated significant factors that affect such 
adjustment costs or firms’ leverage SOA. This thesis consists of three essays that investigate 
crucial determinants of corporate leverage adjustments: equity liquidity, corporate 
sustainability performance (CSP), and employment protection laws (EPLs).  
Chapter 2 examines the impact of liquidity on the speed of adjustment (SOA) of corporate 
leverage at the individual company level. Using a sample of UK firms and data from 35 
countries, respectively, over the period from 1996 to 2016, the chapter finds that high-liquidity 
firms have a significantly faster SOA than less liquid firms. This result survives a series of 
robustness checks and holds after addressing the endogeneity concern using exogenous shocks 
and additional control variables. Further analyses imply that the positive effect of liquidity on 
the SOA exists only for over-levered firms, and this impact is moderated in countries with 
bankruptcy codes. In the cross section, the chapter suggests that the positive relationship 
between liquidity and SOA is more pronounced for firms whose current position is relatively 
close to its target leverage ratio and whose target ratio is relatively stable. The chapter further 
shows that the positive equity liquidity-SOA association is less (more) pronounced for 
firms in strong (weak) institutional environments. The results provide new insights into the 






Chapter 3 investigates the impact of corporate sustainability performance (CSP) on the speed 
at which firms adjust their leverage to the target ratios. Using a large sample of 31 countries 
from 2002 to 2018 with two proxies of CSP, the chapter suggests that firms that invest more in 
CSP move faster toward their target leverage. In exploring the potential underlying economic 
mechanisms through which CSP affects leverage adjustments, the chapter shows that superior 
CSP plays an important role in easing information asymmetry, enhancing stakeholder 
engagements, pushing up stock prices in the stock market, and improving competitive 
advantages in the product market of firms. In further analyses, the positive association between 
CSP and leverage SOA is shown to be less pronounced in countries with high-quality 
institutions. The results remain statistically and quantitatively unchanged from numerous 
robustness tests and IV estimates. Overall, this chapter enlightens the crucial role of CSP in 
shaping the firm’s decisions on dynamic capital structure and provides implications for strategic 
planning of firms on the optimal choices of CSP investments. 
Finally, chapter 4 highlights the impact of employment protection laws (EPLs) on the speed of 
corporate leverage adjustments. By exploiting within-country changes in EPLs across 19 
OECD countries, the chapter suggests that firms operating in countries with more stringent 
EPLs have significantly low leverage adjustment speeds. This association is consistent with the 
view that stringent EPLs raise firms’ costs of adjustment on target leverage. The result survives 
several tests addressing the endogeneity concern by instrument variable approach, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998)’s method, and additional control variables and is robust to a battery of 
robustness checks. The chapter further demonstrates that the response of leverage adjustment 
to changes in EPLs is more pronounced in countries with effective legal enforcement. Generally, 
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1.1. Background of the thesis 
This thesis investigates three crucial determinants of corporate leverage adjustments1: a firm-
level financial factor, i.e., equity liquidity; a firm-level non-financial factor, i.e., corporate 
sustainability performance (hereafter, CSP); and a country-level factor, i.e., employment 
protection laws (hereafter, EPL). 
Capital structure, which relates to decisions as to how the firm is financed, is one of the most 
debatable substantial topics of modern finance theory. This not only reflects this subject has 
received formal attention in recent years but also recognition it has continuously attracted for 
more than five decades. The traditional trade-off theory of capital structure argues that a firm’s 
value can be maximized if the firm operates at the target leverage ratio in which the benefits 
and the costs of capital are balanced (Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 1989; Flannery & Rangan, 
2006; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Hovakimian & Li, 2011). Subsequently, dynamic trade-off models 
predict that firms have an incentive to move toward their optimal capital structure by reducing 
any deviations between their actual debt/equity ratios and those optimal points. However, while 
converging on the targets, a firm may suffer significant costs of adjustment that reduce the 
leverage speed of adjustment (hereafter, SOA). As suggested by Myers (1984), if firms face 
high costs of leverage adjustment, they may deviate far from the optimal point. Hence, it is 
important to pay more attention to identifying the costs of converging, and the time taken for 
any adjustment to occur, rather than just concentrating on refining static trade-off theories. 
 
1 In this thesis, the terms leverage adjustment, leverage dynamic, capital structure dynamic, and capital structure 





Consequently, a new strand of the literature has developed that studies the sources of leverage 
adjustment costs and determinants of SOA.  
Recent studies have explored several determinants of firm’s leverage adjustment speed. At the 
firm level, firm’s leverage SOA is associated with the deviation from that target and the firm’s 
financing needs (Byoun, 2008), equity mispricing (Warr, Elliott, Koëter-Kant, & Öztekin, 
2012), cash flow features (Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, & Smith, 2012), corporate 
governance (Chang, Chou, & Huang, 2014), crash risk exposure (An, Li, & Yu, 2015), debt 
covenants (Devos, Rahman, & Tsang, 2017), and news media coverage (Dang, Dang, 
Moshirian, Nguyen, & Zhang, 2019). At the country level, the speed of leverage adjustments 
depends on the state of the economy (Cook & Tang, 2010), default risks (Elsas & Florysiak, 
2011), institutional environment (Öztekin, 2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), business cycle 
(Halling, Yu, & Zechner, 2016), and political uncertainty (Çolak, Gungoraydinoglu, & Öztekin, 
2018). Adding to this strand of research, we propose liquidity, CSP, and EPL as the new and 
crucial determinants of leverage SOA. 
We include three essays in this thesis as firm-level and country-level determinants of the speed 
that firms adjust to their target leverage ratios. The novelty of this thesis is that the thesis 
introduces new evidence of the impacts of equity liquidity and CSP as firm-level determinants 
of leverage adjustments. The thesis further investigates the distinct impacts of liquidity on the 
leverage SOA for over- and under-levered firms. The potential underlying economic 
mechanisms through which CSP affects leverage adjustments are also explored. By using an 
international sample, the thesis examine how country-level environments impact the sensitivity 
of leverage SOA to liquidity and CSP, hence contributing to the extant literature on the impacts 
of macro-level institutional environments on corporate capital structure decisions and aggregate 




leverage adjustments, that is EPLs. In countries with effective legal enforcement, this 
association is even more pronounced. 
The following sections (1.2 to 1.4) provide an overview of the three essays that are included in 
this thesis. 
1.2. Liquidity and corporate leverage adjustments 
The first essay focuses on the association between equity liquidity and corporate leverage 
adjustments, drawn from two research papers. The first paper, as a pilot study, examines the 
impact of equity liquidity on leverage SOA using the UK data. The second paper studies the 
liquidity-leverage SOA association employing data from 35 countries and further investigates 
the role of institutional environments in shaping this relationship. 
Liquidity plays a crucial role in capital structure decisions. The static trade-off model suggests 
that more liquid firms have lower floatation costs for equity issuance that makes equity 
financing more attractive than debt financing. Consequently, firms with high liquidity are likely 
to have lower leverage ratio. Based on US, Thailand, and Australia markets, respectively, 
Lipson and Mortal (2009), Udomsirikul, Jumreornvong, and Jiraporn (2011) and Nadarajah, 
Ali, Liu, and Haung (2018) investigate the negative effects of liquidity on firm’s capital 
structure. Using data from 39 countries, Gao and Zhu (2015) show that high-liquidity firms are 
expected to have lower debt financing in their capital structure and that this relationship is more 
pronounced in countries with weak institutional environments. These studies, however, focus 
on the static trade-off view of capital structure. It is, therefore, interesting to know how liquidity 
affects the dynamic nature of capital structure, specifically the speed at which firms converge 
their leverage toward the target ratio. Our argument is that greater liquidity is typically 
associated with lower transaction costs (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Butler, Grullon, & 




asymmetry (Friewald, Hennessy, & Jankowitsch, 2015; Fulghieri & Lukin, 2001), stronger 
corporate governance (Edmans, Fang, & Zur, 2013; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002), lower costs of 
issuing both debt and equity financing (Cheung, Im, Noe, & Zhang, 2019; Lipson & Mortal, 
2009), and, ultimately, lower costs of adjustment to the target leverage. Despite the evidence 
that equity liquidity and the speed at which firms adjust toward their target leverage are related, 
and despite the theoretical prediction among them, how liquidity determines firms’ leverage 
SOA is largely unknown to us. The essay fills this knowledge gap. This research further 
highlights the distinct impact of liquidity on leverage SOA for over- and under-levered firms, 
and the joint relationship among equity liquidity, leverage deviation, target stability and 
leverage SOA. 
This essay also contributes to the empirical literature on the relation between equity liquidity 
and capital structure decisions in the UK market. Numerous studies have examined the 
debt/equity choices of UK firms (Bennett & Donnelly, 1993; Bevan & Danbolt, 2002, 2004; 
Dang, 2013), though they do not explore the dynamic capital structure adjustments. In addition, 
whereas several studies investigate leverage adjustments in the US (Devos et al., 2017; 
Faulkender et al., 2012; Warr et al., 2012), it is unclear whether US findings in dynamic capital 
structure research are sample-specific and driven by institutional arrangements peculiar to the 
US market. Therefore, it is important to address whether US results could carry over to other 
markets.  
By using an international sample, the second paper in this essay examines how institutional 
environments affect the association between liquidity and leverage SOA, thus contributing to 
the extant literature on the impacts of country-level environments on firm’s capital structure 
decisions and aggregate financial markets. For example, Öztekin and Flannery (2012) suggest 
that corporations that operate in countries with better institutional settings have lower external 




whether high-quality institutions attenuate the adverse effects of uncertainty on leverage SOA. 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) 
show that liability enforcement and strict legal disclosure requirements benefit financial market 
developments, establishing the links between institutional environments and the aggregate 
financial markets. 
1.3. Corporate Sustainability Performance and corporate leverage adjustments 
The second essay examines the impact of CSP on corporate leverage adjustments, the potential 
underlying economic mechanisms through which CSP affects leverage adjustments, and how 
this association is affected by the country’s institutional quality. 
Corporate sustainability as a firm’s non-financial performance feature has attracted significant 
attention among companies and their stakeholders in recent decades. CSP presents the extent to 
which a company simultaneously integrates economic growth, environmental protection, social 
efficiency, and governance factors into its operations, and ultimately, the influence these 
elements exert on the firm and society (Artiach, Lee, Nelson, & Walker, 2010). Prior literature 
recommends that firms with strong CSP potentially have more voluntary disclosure which 
improves information transparency and reduces agency costs (Dhaliwal, Heitzman, & Li, 2006). 
Investors are also more patient in receiving negative news and are less responsive to mispricing 
signals of such firms (Cao, Titman, Zhan, & Zhang, 2020; Starks, Venkat, & Zhu, 2017). This, 
in turn, makes the firms overvalued, which reduces the cost of equity issuance (Warr et al., 
2012). Flammer (2015a), Flammer (2015b) and Cao, Liang, and Zhan (2019) show that CSP is 
considered as a competitive advantage that helps firms to improve their positions in the product 
market and increase the expected future cash flow realization. It results in a low marginal capital 
transaction cost of firms (Faulkender et al., 2012). Stakeholder theory further suggests that with 




and creditors, thus, improving firms’ revenue and profit and enabling them to capitalise on their 
performance advantages (Bae, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Zheng, 2019; Choi & Wang, 
2009; Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017). Such firms are awarded high ratings by credit rating 
agencies (Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Suh, 2013; Stellner, Klein, & Zwergel, 2015). Overall, 
by reducing the information asymmetry, pushing up the stock prices, improving competitive 
advantages, and enhancing stakeholder engagements of firms, superior CSP reduces firms’ 
agency costs, transaction costs (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014), costs of equity capital 
(Breuer, Müller, Rosenbach, & Salzmann, 2018; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Kim, & Park, 2018; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011), and to some 
extent, costs of bank loans (Goss & Roberts, 2011). These reduced costs, in turn, could 
effectively lower the cost of leverage adjustments. This essay contributes to the literature by 
introducing a new non-financial essential element, CSP, which explains the cross-sectional 
variation of leverage SOA. The research further investigates the potential underlying economic 
channels and identifies four mechanisms that explain the link between CSP and speed of 
leverage adjustments. 
By using a broad range of institutional elements, this essay investigates the important role of 
institutional contexts on capital structure. Institutional environments are generally considered 
as external mechanisms to reduce agency conflicts (An et al., 2015; Çolak et al., 2018; Öztekin, 
2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). They could not only attenuate information asymmetry and 
distress costs, but also enhance financial flexibility and the accessibility to capital markets. 
Institutional settings are not controlled by firms and are a less costly means for firms to manage 
asymmetric information and improve stakeholder engagements. Consequently, strong 
institutional settings can substitute the role of CSP in increasing the leverage SOA, making the 




This essay also contributes to the literature on CSP. Previous literature (Cheng et al., 2014; El 
Ghoul et al., 2018; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Lee & Faff, 2009; Sassen, Hinze, & Hardeck, 2016) 
emphasize the role of CSP on financial performance, firm risks, costs of external financing, and 
financial constraints but not on the capital structure. This research sheds light on the important 
effect of CSP on the dynamic nature of capital structure. Furthermore, to the extent that CSP 
investments bring firms both benefits and costs (Bae et al., 2019; Cheng et al., 2014; Luo, Meier, 
& Oberholzer-Gee, 2011), this essay has significant implications for corporate strategic 
planning on the privately optimal choices of CSP investment. 
1.4. Employment Protection Laws and corporate leverage adjustments 
The third essay focuses on the impact of EPLs and dynamic leverage adjustments, and how a 
country’s legal enforcement affects this association. Since labour is a key factor of production 
that impacts corporate performance and the ability to adopt labour regulations is crucial for 
many features of firms’ operation such as innovation (Acharya, Baghai, & Subramanian, 2013, 
2014), costs of financing (Alimov, 2015; Chen, Kacperczyk, & Ortiz-Molina, 2011), capital 
structure (Simintzi, Vig, & Volpin, 2015), and cash holdings (Cui, John, Pang, & Wu, 2018; 
Karpuz, Kim, & Ozkan, 2020), an investigation of firms’ dynamic capital structure in 
conjunction with EPLs is an important gap to fill in the literature. 
The impact of EPLs on leverage SOA is theoretically debatable. On one hand, the stringency 
of labour regulations limits the flexibility to adjust the workforce, enhances labour adjustment 
costs and decreases operating flexibility of firms. As a result, rigid labour laws may distort 
investment and production decisions, negatively impact corporate performance and growth 
(Autor, Kerr, & Kugler, 2007; Hirsch, 1991), increase distress risks and costs of external capital 
(Alimov, 2015; Chen et al., 2011; Cui et al., 2018). In addition, previous literature suggests that 




protection (Belkhir, Ben-Nasr, & Boubaker, 2016; Hilary, 2006; Scott, 1994). This, in turn, 
increases firms’ agency costs, costs of leverage adjustment, and reduces leverage SOA. On the 
other hand, one can debate that the strong labour regulation may protect creditors’ wealth by 
deterring firms from taking high risk investments and corporate takeovers (Pagano & Volpin, 
2005; Warga & Welch, 1993) and improve firms’ productivity and innovation through worker 
training, selection, hiring, and retention (Acharya et al., 2013, 2014; Belot, Boone, & Van Ours, 
2007; Poschke, 2009). Countries with stringent EPLs, additionally, usually have more friendly 
political environments for workers that may help large firms in events of financial distress. This, 
in turn, lowers firms’ financial risks, lowers the cost of external financing, and enables firms to 
adjust more quickly toward their target leverage. 
This essay contributes to a growing literature that explores the impacts of labour market 
mechanisms on various corporate decisions, such as investment activities (Acharya et al., 2013, 
2014; Dessaint, Golubov, & Volpin, 2017), governance (Atanassov & Kim, 2009), financing 
(Agrawal & Matsa, 2013; Chen et al., 2011; Devos & Rahman, 2018; Matsa, 2010; Simintzi et 
al., 2015), and liquidity management (Cui et al., 2018; Karpuz et al., 2020). The study provides 
new cross-country empirical evidence on the negative and significant role played by a country’s 
labour protection in determining firms’ optimal capital structure decisions. Given the important 
influences of a country’s policies related to workforce on economic agents, our empirical study 
provides valuable insights on policy implications for the corporate sector. This essay also adds 
to the dynamic capital structure literature especially the country-level determinants of leverage 
SOA in conjunction with macroeconomic conditions (Cook & Tang, 2010), institutional 




1.5. Structure of the thesis  
The remainder of the thesis is organized in five chapters. A brief overview of each chapter is 
given below. The thesis covers four peer-reviewed papers being categorized in three essays. 
These papers have been either published or submitted in academic journals at the time of 
submission. Specifically, Chapter 1 provides an overview of the thesis. Chapter 2 consists of 
two research papers: “Liquidity and dynamic leverage adjustments: Evidence from the UK” 
and “Liquidity and speed of leverage adjustment”. Chapter 3 consists of the paper, “The effect 
of corporate sustainability performance on leverage adjustments”. Chapter 4 consists of the 
paper entitled, “OECD labour protection and dynamic leverage adjustments”. Chapters 2 to 4 
are structured with an abstract, introduction, literature review and hypothesis development, data 
and variable construction, methodology, empirical results, conclusion, references, and appendix. 
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the thesis’s findings, contributions, limitations and 





Liquidity and corporate leverage adjustments 
Chapter 2 consists of two research papers that investigate the impact of liquidity on corporate 
leverage adjustments. The first paper, as a pilot study, is entitled, “Liquidity and dynamic 
leverage adjustments: Evidence from the UK”. This paper has been revised and resubmitted in 
Meditari Accountancy Research (SSCI and ABDC - rank A) in year 2020. The paper examines 
the relationship between liquidity and leverage SOA using a sample of UK firms over the period 
of 1996-2016. The results show that firm’s equity liquidity has a positive impact on the speed 
that firms adjust back to their target ratios. Further analyses imply that highly liquid firms that 
are over-levered are likely to move more quickly to their targets while the leverage SOA of 
under-levered firms are not affected by equity liquidity. The paper also documents that the 
positive relationship between liquidity and SOA is more pronounced for firms whose current 
position is relatively close to its target leverage ratio and whose target ratio is relatively stable. 
The second paper entitled “Liquidity and speed of leverage adjustment,” has been published 
online by Australian Journal of Management (SSCI and ABDC –rank A) in year 2020. Using 
panel analysis of data from 35 countries between 1996 and 2016, the paper shows that high-
liquidity firms have a significantly faster SOA than less liquid firms. This result survives a 
series of robustness checks and holds after addressing the endogeneity concern using exogenous 
shocks and additional control variables. The paper also provides the evidence that the positive 
effect of liquidity on the SOA exists only for over-levered firms, and this impact is moderated 
in countries with bankruptcy codes. The paper further finds that the positive liquidity-SOA 






Liquidity and dynamic leverage adjustments: Evidence from the UK 
 Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of equity liquidity, leverage deviation and target 
instability on a firm’s dynamic leverage adjustments using a sample of UK firms over the 
period from 1996 to 2016. Our analyses yield three new findings. First, we find evidence 
that the firm’s equity liquidity has a positive impact on the speed of adjustment (SOA) of its 
leverage ratio back to the target ratio. Second, further analyses imply that highly liquid firms 
that are over-levered are likely to move more quickly to their targets while the leverage SOA 
of under-levered firms are not affected by equity liquidity. Third, we document that the 
positive relationship between liquidity and SOA is more pronounced for firms whose current 
position is relatively close to its target leverage ratio and whose target ratio is relatively 
stable. The results, which are robust to a battery of robustness checks, provide a new insight 
into the determinants of the SOA. 
Key Words: Equity liquidity; leverage adjustment; dynamic trade-off theory; leverage 
deviation; target leverage instability 







The managerial decision on corporate capital structure is one of the most debated topics by 
modern finance scholars and practitioners around the world. While the static trade-off theory 
of capital structure suggests that the value of a firm can be maximized by targeting a leverage 
ratio that minimizes its cost of capital (Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 1989; Harris & Raviv, 
1991), more recently, dynamic trade-off models argue that firms have incentives to adjust 
their actual debt/equity ratio towards the optimal (target) ratio (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; 
Hovakimian & Li, 2011). However, if the adjustment is costly, then the speed of adjustment 
(hereafter SOA) tends to be slowed. Myers (1984) points out that where the costs of leverage 
adjustment are high, one might expect to see firms to deviate from their target debt-equity 
ratios by large amounts for extended periods. Hence, an essential task is to explain the cross-
sectional differences in the dynamics of corporate capital structure decisions, rather than 
only concentrating on purifying the traditional static trade-off models (Graham and Leary, 
2011). In this paper, we investigate the impact of equity liquidity on leverage SOA in the 
UK equity market. 
Recent research has examined various determinants of dynamic leverage adjustments. At the 
firm level, the speed that a firm adjusts toward its target leverage depends on the deviation 
from that target and the firm’s financing needs (Byoun, 2008), equity mispricing (Warr, 
Elliott, Koëter-Kant, & Öztekin, 2012), cash flow features (Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, 
& Smith, 2012), corporate governance (Chang, Chou, & Huang, 2014), crash risk exposure 
(An, Li, & Yu, 2015), debt covenants (Devos, Rahman, & Tsang, 2017), and news media 
coverage (Dang, Dang, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Zhang, 2019). At the macro and country level, 
the speed of leverage adjustment is affected by the state of economy (Cook & Tang, 2010), 
institutional environment (Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), business cycle (Halling, Yu, & 




Adding to this strand of research, we propose liquidity as a new and important determinant 
of leverage SOA. 
Liquidity plays an important role in firms’ financial decisions. Using data of the US market, 
Lipson and Mortal (2009) and Frieder and Martell (2006) show that firms with high equity 
liquidity are significantly less leveraged. Based on Thailand and Australian markets, 
Udomsirikul, Jumreornvong, and Jiraporn (2011) and Nadarajah, Ali, Liu, and Haung (2018) 
also document the negative relation between liquidity and firms’ leverage. However, these 
studies focus on the static trade-off view of capital structure. Our paper focuses on the impact 
of equity liquidity on the dynamic capital structure. Our argument is that greater liquidity is 
typically associated with lower transaction costs, lower levels of information asymmetry, 
stronger corporate governance, lower costs of issuing both debt and equity financing, and, 
ultimately, lower costs of adjustment to the target leverage (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; 
Berkman & Nguyen, 2010; Dang, Moshirian, Wee, & Zhang, 2015; Lipson & Mortal, 2009). 
Specifically, Stoll and Whaley (1983) first suggest that illiquid firms have higher stock 
transaction costs, and thus higher required rate of return from investors. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) argue that transaction costs, like a tax, increase required rate of return for 
small and illiquid stocks. Looking just at issuance costs, Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) 
show that investment banking fees are lower for more liquid firms. These issuance costs 
must be acknowledged when raising equity through external financing and are an implicit 
cost of external equity. Using a theoretical model, Hennessy and Whited (2005) confirm that 
firms with high liquidity are more likely to have lower transaction costs, and thus lower cost 
of equity. Cheung, Im, Noe, and Zhang (2019) indicate that firms with high liquidity not 
only have easier access to the equity market, but also have lower costs of debt financing. 
Hence, one might expect that equity liquidity would reduce the cost of leverage adjustment, 




The vast majority of existing studies which address leverage adjustment issues have been 
based on the US-data (Devos et al., 2017; Faulkender et al., 2012; Liao, Mukherjee, & Wang, 
2015; Zhou, Tan, Faff, & Zhu, 2016), with there being sparse evidence of empirical studies 
on SOA and its determinants in other markets. According to Dimson, Nagel, and Quigley 
(2003), it is not obvious and dangerous for investors to extend the results from US experience 
to other countries where capital markets are less developed and corporate ownership much 
more concentrated. In this study, we take a step in this direction by basing our analysis on 
the UK market. On one hand, UK is considered a major worldwide economic market. It is 
large and has grown rapidly in recent years (IMF, 2011). The London Stock Exchange has a 
huge daily volume of transactions, competing with the major US stock exchanges, such as 
NYSE and NASDAQ (Charitou, Neophytou, & Charalambous, 2004). Therefore, the UK 
provides a financial environment “ideal” for the examination of issues on equity liquidity 
and corporate capital structure decision-making. On the other hand, there are differences 
between the US and UK in terms of corporate ownership structure, institutional ownership 
concentration, and the constitution and operation of corporate boards (Short & Keasey, 
1999). The UK results can thus add unique insights into the existing literature on corporate 
capital structure dynamics. 
The potential impact of equity liquidity on leverage SOA, furthermore, may be conditional 
on the position of a firm’s actual leverage relative to its target ratio. Particularly, an over-
levered firm should have different strategies from an under-levered firm for adjusting its 
leverage ratio. A liquid over-levered firm is in an advantageous position to issue more equity 
and so move toward its target leverage ratio. However, a liquid under-levered firm has a 
much lower need to issue new equity capital and so benefit from the advantages that stem 
from the higher equity liquidity. Further, firms deviating too far from targets and/or changing 




lower equity liquidity (Zhou et al., 2016). These firms, moreover, will be wary of attempting 
fully adjusting back to their target ratio (Dang, Kim, & Shin, 2014). The reason is that 
adjustment costs are an increasing function of the target leverage deviation, i.e., there is a 
proportional cost function (Leary & Roberts, 2005). The firm’s managers may also concern 
that the target leverage ratio might move during the adjustment phase, making it highly 
unlikely that they will ever achieve their target ratio. In this circumstance, the management 
feels most comfortable in moving towards the target ratio in small steps and by doing so 
reducing the impact that equity liquidity will have on the SOA. Hence, we expect that the 
association between equity liquidity and corporate leverage SOA will be conditional on both 
the extent of its deviation from and the instability of the target level through time. 
Our findings show that firms with higher liquidity reveal a higher leverage SOA to their 
target level. Further analyses provide evidence that equity liquidity only has a positive 
impact on the SOA of over-levered firms but no significant impact on that of under-levered 
firms. In addition, we remark an interactive association among equity liquidity, leverage 
deviation, target instability, and SOA: the positive association between a firm’s equity 
liquidity and SOA is more pronounced for firms with smaller leverage deviation and/or 
higher target stability. 
The findings of our study contribute to three strands of corporate finance literature. First, 
while prior studies have well documented the impact of equity liquidity on firms’ static 
capital structure (e.g., Lipson and Mortal, 2009), there has been no prior research that 
examines the important impact of liquidity on corporate dynamic leverage adjustments. 
Previous studies show that a highly liquid firm has lower financial transaction costs, which 
is the main part of leverage adjustment costs (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). Moreover, high 




2005; Cheung et al., 2019; Hennessy & Whited, 2005). Despite the evidence that equity 
liquidity and the speed at which firms adjust toward their target leverage are related, and 
despite the theoretical prediction among them, how liquidity determines firms’ leverage 
SOA is largely unknown to us. Our study fills this knowledge gap. 
Second, our study contributes to the empirical literature on the association between equity 
liquidity and firms’ capital structure decisions in the UK market. Although several studies 
have examined the capital structure choices of UK firms (Bennett & Donnelly, 1993; Bevan 
& Danbolt, 2002, 2004; Dang, 2013a), they do not investigate the dynamic leverage 
adjustments. Our study thus fills this important gap in the literature by examining dynamic 
leverage adjustments in the UK.  Specifically, we use a comprehensive sample of UK firms 
over the period 1996 – 2016 to test our hypotheses. Whereas there are some studies 
examining leverage adjustments in the US (Devos et al., 2017; Faulkender et al., 2012; Warr 
et al., 2012), it is unclear whether US findings in dynamic capital structure research are 
sample-specific and driven by institutional arrangements peculiar to the US market. 
Therefore, it is important to address whether US results could carry over to other markets. 
Third, our study contributes to the empirical literature on the joint relationship among equity 
liquidity, leverage deviation, target stability and leverage SOA. Prior literature suggests that 
firms with greater leverage deviation or target instability confront higher financial risks, pay 
even higher costs of equity and have low equity liquidity (Ippolito, Steri, & Tebaldi, 2012; 
Zhou et al., 2016) while equity liquidity has been documented to have impacts on leverage 
adjustments. Given that there is evidence that equity liquidity, leverage deviation, target 
stability and leverage adjustments are associated, how the first three factors jointly influence 




The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 provides the literature and hypotheses development. 
Section 3 describes the sample, data collection and variable construction. The empirical 
methods are reported in section 4 and the results are presented in section 5. The study is 
concluded in section 6.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Related literature on capital structure and leverage adjustments 
The irrelevance framework of Modigliani and Miller (1958), Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
suggests a logically consistent proof that, with the assumption of “a perfect market” such as 
unfettered arbitrage opportunities, no possibility of firms’ bankruptcy, and no corporate 
taxes, the amount of firms’ debt issues does not affect its total market value. Consistent with 
this theory, numerous studies have found the same results under different and more general 
assumptions (Hirshleifer, 1966; Stiglitz, 1969, 1972, 1973). However, when relaxing the 
assumption of no corporate taxes and given that firms’ interest payments are deductible from 
taxable income, the total market value of the firm may be influenced by changes in its level 
of debts, and this has resulted in the development of a number of capital structure theories.  
The trade-off theory predicts that firms will maintain an optimal capital structure that 
maximizes firm value by balancing the benefits (e.g., interest tax shield) and costs (e.g., 
financial distress costs) of debts (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Kim, 1978; Kraus & 
Litzenberger, 1973; Robichek & Myers, 1965). A large number of studies support the 
targeting behaviour of firms, such as Leary and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) for US firms, and Ozkan (2001), Bunn and Young 
(2004), Beattie, Goodacre, and Thomson (2006), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) for 
UK firms. Firms may take different paths to their optimal capital structure at potentially 




Ramjee & Gwatidzo, 2012). The source of this asymmetry is the differences in the costs of 
adjustment that firms face. Fischer et al. (1989) develop a dynamic trade-off model and show 
that firms may have a range of optimal ratios. Bunn and Young (2004) and Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) confirm that UK and US firms, respectively, do not identify a strict target 
leverage, but rather a range over which their target ratios are allowed to vary.  
Contrast with the trade-off theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) endorse the pecking order 
theory. Accordingly, there is a capital hierarchy in financing firms’ investments: internally 
generated funds are the first resort for financing, then debt, and equity issues is the last 
(Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). This pecking order to financing could arise due to the 
asymmetry in the tax code (Stiglitz, 1973) or asymmetric information and adverse selection 
(Heaton, 2002; Myers, 2003; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). Implicitly, the pecking order 
theory suggests that firms would have neither strong preference about their debt-equity ratios 
nor strong inclination to reserve capital structure changes caused by financing needs or 
profitability growth.  
Overall, whereas the trade-off theory predicts the existence of target leverage and firms’ 
adjustment towards such targets, the pecking order theory does not (Barclay, Smith, & 
Morellec, 2006). Nevertheless, several previous studies suggest that an integrated context 
that combines the arguments of both trade-off and pecking order models should be built 
(Fama & French, 2002).  Beattie et al. (2006) indicate the essential need for a model 
combining factors of the trade-off and pecking order theories and suggest that when 
examining the target leverage, we can reconcile such two competing theories. Hovakimian, 
Opler, and Titman (2001) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) show that though firms have 
optimal leverage, they still prefer internal funds to external financing. Barclay and Smith 




selection cost can affect firms’ financing decision-making. Thereby, with the existence of 
information costs, although firms have target leverage ratios, they still prefer internal 
financing (Leary & Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007). Supporting this stream of argument, 
Frank and Goyal (2003) explain that “the pecking order theory implies that the financing 
deficit ought to wipe out the effects of other variables. If the financing deficit is simply one 
factor among many that firms trade-off, then what is left is a generalized version of the trade-
off theory”. By doing a survey with 392 CFOs in the US about the cost of capital, capital 
budget and capital structure, Graham and Harvey (2001) ask directly whether firms have an 
optimal or target leverage. The results show that 10% of firms have strict target leverage, 
34% have a somewhat tight target or range, and 37% have a flexible target. For others who 
do not have tight or somewhat strict targets, they still seem to set and try to move back to 
the targets, even they do not recognize that operation. Similarly, Correia and Cramer (2008) 
do a survey in South Africa and find that only 21% of the firms did not follow a target debt-
equity ratio. For others who follow a target, 34% of companies had a somewhat tight target 
debt-equity ratio. Dissanaike, Lambrecht, and Seabra (2001) conclude that there are about 
60% of UK firms which pursue a target leverage ratio. In sum, while the evidence is far from 
conclusive, on balance it seems that some form of target or target range is employed by firms, 
consistent with the logic of the trade-off theory (Beattie et al., 2006). 
At which speed that we expect firms to adjust toward the target leverage? Previous literature 
suggests that firms facing different levels of adjustment cost have different speeds of 
converging to the target ratios. In particular, Leary and Roberts (2005) provide evidence that 
the cost of leverage adjustment significantly affects firms’ behavior regarding leverage 
rebalancing. Furthermore, Strebulaev (2007) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) find that 
firms adjust their capital structure more frequently when the transaction costs are relatively 




speed of capital structure dynamics. This has motivated a line of research into what the 
sources of these adjustment costs are and how they can explain cross-sectional variations in 
the SOA. Lööf (2004) argues that firms which diverge further away from their optimal 
leverage have relatively slower leverage SOA. Warr et al. (2012) find that the mispricing of 
equity affects firms’ SOA, and this association depends on whether the firm is under- or 
over-levered. Chang et al. (2014) and Liao et al. (2015) suggest an association between 
corporate governance and dynamic leverage adjustments, indicating that better governed 
firms face lower costs of adjustment and so will adjust more quickly towards their targets. 
An et al. (2015) show a negative link between the crash-risk exposures of firms and leverage 
SOA although this link is attenuated in countries with transparent information environments. 
Zhou et al. (2016) and Devos et al. (2017) study the effects on the leverage SOA of a firm’s 
cost of equity capital and debt covenants, respectively. Most recently, Dang et al. (2019) 
show that greater news coverage and more positive news sentiment increase the leverage 
SOA significantly. The effects of macroeconomic conditions, political uncertainty, business 
cycles and institutional factors on the SOA have also been investigated (Çolak et al., 2018; 
Cook & Tang, 2010; Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). In brief, 
though this strand of research has investigated several significant factors that affect a firm’s 
leverage SOA, the question of whether equity liquidity has an impact on the leverage SOA, 
which is the focus of our study, remains silent. 
Our study also relates to the capital structure literature in the UK market. Marsh (1982) finds 
that market conditions and the history of security prices are important determinants of firms 
in choosing between debt and equity. He also suggests that firms appear to make their choice 
of financing sources as if they have target levels of debt in mind. Ozkan (2001) indicates 
that UK firms do have target leverage ratios and converge to such targets relatively quickly 




(including the UK) adjust their leverage at different speeds to reach target structures and 
provide evidence that environmental factors and traditions are important determinants of 
leverage SOA. On the other hand, Watson and Wilson (2002) examine the UK market and 
highlight that the pecking order model provides a more empirically plausible explanation of 
the changes in financing than the static trade-off model, mainly for small and medium-sized 
firms. Examining a sample of 218 UK firms from 1964 to 1990 using an error correction 
model, Dissanaike et al. (2001) find that one financing approach is not likely to be 
descriptive for all firms. Employing the same method but larger sample size and more recent 
study period (including 1340 UK firms over the period 1980-2007), Dang (2013b) suggests 
that UK, French and German firms adjust towards target leverage quickly in both the partial 
adjustment and error correction models, which is consistent with the trade-off theory. They 
further highlight that the trade-off theory explains these firms’ capital structure decisions 
better than the pecking order theory in the models nesting the two theories and pecking order 
considerations are of minor importance to UK, German and French firms. In sum, there is a 
growing literature examining UK firms. However, these studies have only examined either 
the determinants of capital structure, or one of the trade-off and pecking order theories. We 
are the first study to examine the determinant of speed of leverage adjustment in this 
important market. 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
There has been a stream of literature that documents the role of equity liquidity on firms’ 
capital structure decisions. Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest that it is desirable to consider 
the transaction costs when evaluating the investments on stocks and claim that investors 
require higher rates of return on small and illiquid firms. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) 




negative relationship between equity liquidity and the cost of capital, that is, higher equity 
liquidity means lower cost of capital. Cheung et al. (2019) further highlight that more liquid 
firms are more likely to access debt financing and have lower costs of debt compared to their 
counterparties. In sum, firms with higher liquidity have lower costs of capital and are easier 
to access external financing sources.  
Liquidity can also influence the transaction costs associated with raising new external equity 
capital. First, an illiquid firm has to offer a discount on the current share price to attract the 
capital that it requires. This discount is reflected by the magnitude of the bid-ask spread and 
price impact of issuing new equity (Bundgaard & Ahm, 2012; Silber, 1991). This view is 
supported by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who find that the illiquidity of a firm’s equity 
is valued in the market. Thereby, illiquid stocks tend to be traded at a discount. Second, when 
a firm raises new equity capital, it incurs the issuance fees that an issuer will have to pay 
institutions who assist it in the fund-raising process. Butler et al. (2005) find that institutions 
charge higher issuance fees for less liquid firms as they are faced with greater risks. The 
bottom line is that firms with higher equity liquidity will have lower transaction costs 
associated with issuing new equity and so have greater incentives to rapidly correct any 
deviation of its actual leverage level from its target.  
In addition, information is likely to be another important channel between equity liquidity 
and leverage SOA. This argument suggests that greater liquidity facilitates more informed 
trading and produces more information about the firm (Friewald, Hennessy, & Jankowitsch, 
2015; Fulghieri & Lukin, 2001). Consequently, stock liquidity helps to reduce adverse 
selection and equity mispricing, thus lowering the agency costs, and thereby, reduce leverage 





In our analysis, we address the previous discussion by studying the association between the 
firm’s equity liquidity and the speed at which it adjusts the leverage ratio to the target. We 
propose the first hypothesis as follows:  
H1: Equity liquidity has a positive impact on leverage SOA. 
As previously discussed, it is likely that higher equity liquidity translates into lower costs 
associated with raising additional equity capital, and therefore, higher leverage SOA. 
However, this impact may depend on whether the firm is over-levered or under-levered. 
Specifically, an over-levered firm can adjust by either issuing more equities, repurchasing 
debts or some combination of the two. The actual course that an over-levered firm will 
pursue is very much dependent on its funding needs. As the assets of the firms in our sample 
are growing on average by slightly more than 5% p.a., an over-levered firm will have to both 
expand its funding and correct its over-levered position, which suggests that it is more likely 
for such firms to issue new equity capital (Brennan et al., 1998; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 
1996). Hence, one would think that higher equity liquidity would be of direct benefit to these 
over-levered firms. An under-levered firm adjusting back to its target can issue more debt, 
repurchase equity, or combine these two approaches. Again, as the firms in our sample are 
on average expanding, this increases the likelihood that firms will have to largely relying on 
issuing debt to correct their capital structure imbalance and so the liquidity of their equity 
will be far less important than it is for over-levered firms. 
From the above discussion, we propose the next hypothesis: 





Finally, we consider how the deviation from target ratios and instability in these ratios affect 
the association between equity liquidity and leverage SOA. We have already raised the 
possibility that highly liquid firms are positively associated with fast leverage SOA, which 
is a result of the lower cost of leverage adjustment. However, because of the far deviation 
from or high instability of its target leverage ratio, it is possible that a firm should pay a 
penalty in the form of higher cost of equity capital. Specifically, a firm with higher deviation 
from or higher instability in its target level will confront higher financial risks, which 
influence the required rate of return on corporate equity capital, and hence, leave greater 
costs of equity capital and lower equity liquidity for the firm. Consistent with this argument, 
Zhou et al. (2016) derive a theoretical link between leverage deviation and costs of equity 
and confirm that the firm’s cost of equity positively relates to the deviation from its target 
level of leverage. Ippolito et al. (2012) also suggest the significantly positive association 
between the deviation from target and the expected equity return (then, cost of equity 
capital). Specifically, investors require a higher expected equity return for firms that deviate 
further from the target leverage. These firms, consequently, confront greater cost of equity 
that leads to lower equity liquidity. Accordingly, the question that we raise here is whether 
the magnitude of the positive relationship between equity liquidity and leverage SOA will 
be impacted by the extent of the deviation between the actual and the target ratios and/or the 
stability of target ratios of firms.  
Building on the above discussion, we investigate the following hypotheses: 
H3: The positive impact of equity liquidity on leverage SOA is less pronounced for firms that 
deviate further from target ratios.  
H4: The positive impact of equity liquidity on leverage SOA is less pronounced for firms that 




3. Data and variable construction 
3.1. Data 
The annual firm-level and industry-level accounting data are retrieved from Worldscope via 
the Datastream database. To estimate liquidity measures, we collect daily data (e.g., bid/ask 
price, trading volume and stock return) from this database. Only data for firms with common 
securities are collected whereas those with distinct characters, for instance warrants, trusts, 
funds, and non-equity stocks, are excluded. Financial and utility corporations are also 
eliminated from the sample since these corporations are subject to special regulations on 
financing policies. Following conventional practices (Halling et al., 2016), the subsequent 
screens are applied to our sample. Firm-year observations in cases where the book value of 
total assets or market capitalization is zero are dropped. Firm-year observations with 
negative net sales or a net leverage ratio of less than -1 are also removed. Additionally, we 
remove firm-years with book leverage ratios or market leverage ratios missing or greater 
than one. To avoid outliers, very small firms that have average book values of total assets 
less than 10 million US dollars are excluded. By applying all the above screens, the final 
sample contains 20,090 firm-year observations for the UK market during the period from 
1996 to 2016. Finally, to reduce the possible impacts of extreme values, we winsorize both 
the dependent and independent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
3.2. Variable construction 
3.2.1. Leverage measurements 
Based on existing studies (An et al., 2015; Chang et al., 2014; Halling et al., 2016), we use 
both the book ratio (𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉)  and the market ratio (𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑉)  of leverage as dependent 







                                                                                                                     (1) 
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of firm i’s interest-bearing debt (i.e., the sum of short-term and 
long-term book value of interest-bearing debt) at time t, and 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of firm 
i’s total assets at time t.  




                                                                                                     (2) 
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the book value of firm i’s interest-bearing debt (the sum of short-term and long-
term book value of interest-bearing debt) at time t, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the number of common shares 
outstanding and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the stock price per share at time t.   
3.2.2. Equity liquidity 
We have four proxies for equity liquidity: Amihud illiquidity (Amihud, 2002), zero-return 
proportion (Lesmond, Ogden, & Trzcinka, 1999), daily percentage quoted spread (Chung & 
Zhang, 2014; Fong, Holden, & Trzcinka, 2017), and turnover (Berkman & Nguyen, 2010; 
Lipson & Mortal, 2009). In the main analysis, we use Amihud illiquidity score which is the 
most popular measure of liquidity (Lipson & Mortal, 2009; Nadarajah et al., 2018). We also 
test the robustness of our findings using the other three alternative measures. Note that while 
turnover is a measure of liquidity, the three other measures provide an inverse measure of 
liquidity (or inverse liquidity).  
Specifically, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is defined as the average ratio of the 








where 𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑 is the stock return of firm i on day d in year t, 𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑑 is the daily volume in 
dollars of firm i on day d in year t. This ratio reflects the change of daily stock price related 
to one trading volume dollar, in other words, the daily price impact of the trading flow.  
In this study, we use the annual average of this daily liquidity measure for each stock i: 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 =  1/𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∑
|𝑅𝑖,𝑡,𝑑|
𝐷𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑑




where 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the number of days for which the volume of stock i in year t is positive: 
The other three measures of liquidity that we employ are: 
1. Following Lesmond et al. (1999) and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009), we 
define zero-return proportion (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡) as a proxy for liquidity, which is the proportion 
of trading days that have no change in price over the year (zero return) from the previous 
day. This measure is suggested due to two reasons. First, illiquid stocks have a higher 
probability of having days without any trading volume and hence, zero return. Second, 
illiquid stocks have higher transaction costs and more difficulties to acquire private 
information. Consequently, even these stocks have positive trading volume days, they 
confront the difficulty in obtaining the relevant information and thus, are more likely to have 
zero-return days.  
2. Following Chung and Zhang (2014) and Fong et al. (2017), we also define the daily 
closing percent quoted spread (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) as a proxy for liquidity, i.e., daily closing bid-ask 
spread divided by the midpoint spread averaged over the number of positive volume days. 
These studies show that the simple daily bid-ask spread measure provides a good 
approximation of equity liquidity. This measure is also highly correlated with the bid-ask 
spread from intraday data. Note that this is also an inverse measure of liquidity (essentially 
measure of trading costs or illiquidity). The annual average of this daily liquidity proxy for 




𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  1/𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∑
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡,𝑑− 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑑
(𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡,𝑑+ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑑)/2
                                                    (5)
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
1  
where  𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡,𝑑  is the closing ask price of stock i on day d in year t, 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡,𝑑   is the 
closing bid price of stock i on day d in year t, and 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the number of days for which the volume of 
stock i in year t is positive. 
3. Turnover (𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) has been widely used as a proxy of liquidity in the literature (e.g., 
Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998); and Berkman and Nguyen (2010)). The daily turnover is calculated 
as the ratio of number of shares traded on a day to the total number of shares outstanding. The average 
value of daily turnover across all trading days in that year defines the yearly turnover of the stock. Using 
turnover rate as a measure of liquidity has a strong theoretical support. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
document that equity liquidity and trading frequency have a significant correlation. Therefore, the 
turnover rate is an appropriate indirect proxy of liquidity. Specifically, the higher the turnover is, the 
more liquid the stock is.  
3.2.3. Target leverage 
The current literature on capital structure suggests that the target level of a firm’s leverage 
is a function of time-varying firm characteristics and industrial elements (An et al., 2015; 
Devos et al., 2017; Fama & French, 2002; Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Flannery & Rangan, 
2006; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). There are different sets of 
determinants that have been used in the previous studies to achieve a reliable estimate of the 
target leverage ratio. The variables used in the various studies differ but are essentially 
different variables to proxy for the same firm characteristics. For instance, firm size is 
measured using either total assets in some studies (e.g., Zhou et al. (2016); Devos et al. 
(2017)) or sales in other studies (e.g., Halling et al. (2016); Uysal (2011)). Since these 




(Frank & Goyal, 2009). Following Flannery and Hankins (2013) and An et al. (2015), we 
regress the observed leverage ratio (LEV) on a set of leverage determinants, that is:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖+1,          𝐿𝐸𝑉 ∈  {𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉, 𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑉}                                      (6)  
where each firm is indexed by i and time by t.  𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of firm and industry variables 
associated with the operation costs and benefits with different leverage levels including firm 
size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡), tangibility (𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡), growth opportunity (𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡), profitability (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡), 
depreciation (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡) , research and development (𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡) , a research and development 
dummy (𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡) , and industry median of leverage  (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡)2 . The trade-off 
hypothesis predicts that 𝛽 ≠ 0, and the variation in 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 is nontrivial. We also note that 
by modeling optimal capital structure in period t+1 as a function of determinants observed 
in period t, then the endogeneity concerns are somewhat mitigated. 
We measure the target leverage ratio of each firm as the fitted value obtained from equation 
(6): 
  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝛽̂̂𝑋𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                           (7)   
3.2.4. Leverage deviation 
The deviation from the target level is measured as the absolute difference between the target 
and the observed leverage ratio: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣_𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  |𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗ − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡|                                                                                          (8) 
where 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗  is the target leverage ratio defined above and 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the observed leverage 
ratio of firm i at time t. 
 




3.2.5. Target instability 




∗                                                                                          (9) 
where 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
∗  and 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  are the target leverage ratios of firm i at time t and t-1, 
respectively. The higher level of ∆𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is, the more unstable the target leverage is. 
4. Empirical methods 
The dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure argues that firms have an optimal target 
capital structure. If there is no cost of adjustments, the firm would have no incentive to 
deviate from this target, and the adjustment speed would be instantaneously one. However, 
due to market imperfections such as asymmetric information and financing costs, firms may 
temporarily deviate from their target leverage. The standard partial adjustment model 
measures the rate at which the firm converges its leverage to the target ratio. There are two 
methods to estimate this model as suggested by prior research. A two-step method is used 
by Hovakimian and Li (2011), Chang et al. (2014), An et al. (2015) and Çolak et al. (2018). 
The first step involves obtaining an estimate of the target leverage ratio following the 
procedures described previously. The partial adjustment model is then estimated based on 
the target ratio obtained in the first step to calculate a measure of the leverage SOA. The 
one-step approach is a reduced-form model from the two-step method to achieve the estimate 
of the SOA directly (Flannery & Rangan, 2006). The details of the one-step and two-step 




4.1. Two-step model to estimate SOA 
In the two-step model, the SOA is estimated by two steps. First, the target leverage ratio is 
estimated as in the section 3.2.3. Next, the leverage SOA is obtained by estimating the 
standard partial adjustment model of capital structure shown below:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1  − 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝜕(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  −  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1                                     (10) 
where 𝜕 is a measure of aggregate leverage SOA of firms that diverge away from the target 
of next period. The gap between the target and actual leverage ratios declines over time and 
thus, 𝜕 is greater than zero. Further, because of the existence of adjustment costs, firms do 
not fully converge to the target level in one period, resulting in  𝜕 being smaller than one.  
4.2. One-step model to estimate SOA 
In the one-step approach of partial adjustment model, the target leverage estimated from Eq. 
(7) is substituted into Eq. (10). The specification is rearranged to yield the model as follows:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1                                                      (11) 
To test our hypotheses, we follow the one-step method (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Halling 
et al., 2016), which gives us the estimates of leverage SOA from estimating a single equation. 
The advantage of the one-step model is that it does not require a separate estimate of the 
unobservable target leverage and thus avoid any estimation errors arising from generated 
regressors as in the two-step models (Pagan, 1984). 
4.3. Effect of liquidity on SOA 
We follow Cook and Tang (2010), Devos et al. (2017) and Zhou et al. (2016) and augment 




significance of 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 on the leverage SOA (H1). In particular, the equity liquidity variable 
(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡) is proxied by Amihud illiquidity measure. The interaction term is the product of the 
equity liquidity (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡) and the first lag of the firm’s actual leverage ratio. We model this 
economic relation as follows: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜕𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1  (12) 
In Eq. (12), our main focus is the coefficient of the interaction term 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡. Since 
we hypothesize that equity liquidity has a positive impact on the SOA (H1), and the variable 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡  is proxied by the Amihud illiquidity measure, we expect the coefficient on the 
interaction term, 𝛽2, to be positive
3. This implies that the coefficient on the lagged leverage 
is smaller for firms with higher equity liquidity and hence, they exhibit a faster SOA (𝜕).  
To address the second hypothesis as to whether the effect of equity liquidity on leverage 
SOA differs for under- and over-levered firms (H2), we re-estimate Eq. (12) for both 
categories of firms. To do so, we divide the sample into two sub-samples with one group 
being entirely composed of firms whose actual leverage ratio is above its target and the other 
group composed of firms whose actual leverage ratio is below its target. If the position of 
actual leverage relative to the target ratio has an impact on the relation between equity 
liquidity and leverage SOA, we expect that the interaction between equity liquidity and 
leverage ratio (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) is more significant and positive for over-levered subsample 
but far less or even insignificant for under-levered subsample. 
 
3 As 𝜕 indicates the leverage SOA, a positive 𝛽2  indicates a negative relationship between Amihud score 
(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡)  and leverage SOA. However, as Amihud score (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡)  is an illiquidity measure (Amihud and 




4.4. Effect of liquidity on SOA: conditional on leverage deviation and target change 
Our next hypotheses (H3 and H4) relate to how the relationship between equity liquidity 
and SOA is conditional on leverage deviation and target stability. To examine this issue, 
following Devos et al. (2017), we include the triple interaction terms among equity liquidity, 
actual leverage ratio and leverage deviation/ target stability in the SOA regression (Eq. (12)). 
Specifically, the augmented models take the following forms: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
+    𝛽6(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜕𝑗𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1                             (13) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
+    𝛽6(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜕𝑗𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1                            (14) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
+    𝛽6(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽7𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽9(𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
+    𝛽10(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜕𝑗𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1               (15) 
where Eq. (13) is used to examine the hypothesis H3, Eq. (14) is used to examine the 
hypothesis H4, and Eq. (15) is the combination of both hypotheses. 
As previously discussed, there is likely to be a negative relationship between the costs of 
adjusting the leverage ratio and the liquidity of a firm’s equity. This will translate into firms 




is what the impact of leverage deviation and target instability have on this incentive. We 
propose that firms with greater leverage deviation and/or target instability would have higher 
financial risks and pay penalties in the form of higher costs of equity capital and thus, have 
lower equity liquidity. Hence, we might expect a positive sign on the interaction term 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and negative signs on the triple interaction terms 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡. We use leverage deviation and target instability as dummy 
variables by assigning “1” for high leverage deviation (high target instability), and “0” for 
low leverage deviation (low target instability) based on the median value. Specifically, if 
values of leverage deviation (target instability) are higher than the median, then they 
represent high leverage deviation (target instability); otherwise, low leverage deviation 
(target instability). To further confirm the results, we also examine these relationships for 
over- and under-levered firms by re-estimating the Eq. (15) for the two sub-samples. 
4.5. Econometric method 
Since all the main specifications in this paper are dynamic panel data models, traditional 
pooled OLS or firm fixed effects estimators would result in biased and inconsistent estimates 
(Baltagi, 2008). Specifically, whereas the pooled OLS estimator is likely to overestimate the 
coefficient of the dynamic variable (1 − 𝜕) and thus underestimating the level of SOA (𝜕), 
the firm fixed effects model produces biased estimates because of the potential correlations 
between the dynamic variable and the error term. Particularly, the firm fixed effects model 
underestimates the coefficient of the dynamic variable, hence, overestimates the SOA 
(Nickell, 1981). The inconsistence is more likely to occur in case of relatively short period 
of sample data (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). Hence, the use of OLS in this study would have 




Due to the limitations of the pooled OLS and firm fixed effects models and the dynamic 
nature of our panel models, we follow the recent research and use Blundell and Bond 
(1998)’s two-step system GMM. This is the most reliable method to estimate the dynamic 
short panels with the lagged dependent variable and endogenous independent variables 
(Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Zhou et al., 2016). In applying the two-step system GMM, we 
estimate our model by exploring suitable instruments for the dynamic variable(s) (e.g., 
leverage ratios, interaction terms between leverage ratios and main variables), that is, lagged 
values of the dynamic term(s). 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics for the entire sample are presented in Table 1, which includes 
descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlation coefficients of the determinants of the target 
leverage (Panel B). In our sample, the mean book leverage ratio is 0.1793 and the mean 
market leverage is 0.1981. The extent of the cross-sectional variation is illustrated by the 
difference between the first quartile of the book (market) leverage ratio of 0.0211 (0.0138) 
and the third quartile at 0.2805 (0.3099). In terms of the liquidity measure, the means of 
Amihud, zero-return day’s proportion, turnover and daily quoted spread measures are 
23.1187, 0.3495, 0.2820 and 0.0531, respectively. The mean book leverage deviation 
(0.1102) is lower than the mean market leverage deviation (0.1349). On average, the absolute 
change in target market leverage (0.0085) is higher than that in target book leverage 
(0.0031). In our sample, the average value of asset tangibility-total assets ratio is 27.35%, 
market-to-book ratio is 2.528, profitability-total assets ratio is 6.55%, depreciation-total 




among the determinants of the target leverage ratio. We see that these correlations are low 
suggesting that there is little concern with multicollinearity.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics including the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, first quantile, median, and third quantile of firm- level and industry-level 
variables for the entire sample in Panel A, and correlation coefficients in Panel B. The study 
period is from 1996 to 2016. The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Min Max p25 Median p75 
BLEV 20090 0.1793 0.1725 0.0000 0.7615 0.0211 0.1472 0.2805 
MLEV 20090 0.1981 0.2085 0.0000 0.8648 0.0138 0.1405 0.3099 
Amihud 18132 23.1187 58.7806 0.0010 407.2400 0.3287 3.3604 16.1732 
PropZero 18780 0.3495 0.3594 0.0040 2.5000 0.0711 0.3320 0.4941 
Turnover 18102 0.2820 0.2799 0.0115 1.7022 0.1094 0.1998 0.3490 
Spread 19957 0.0531 0.0565 0.0006 0.3036 0.0157 0.0361 0.0698 
LevDev 
(BLEV) 
16545 0.1102 0.0894 0.0000 0.7024 0.0489 0.0947 0.1444 
LevDev 
(MLEV) 
16545 0.1349 0.1151 0.0000 0.8283 0.0550 0.1075 0.1765 
ΔTarget 
(BLEV) 
13825 0.0031 0.0288 -0.2119 0.3128 -0.0109 0.0029 0.0165 
ΔTarget 
(MLEV) 
13825 0.0085 0.0513 -0.3079 0.3178 -0.0220 0.0068 0.0355 
SIZE 20090 11.4956 1.8997 8.7321 17.0757 10.0095 11.1488 12.6488 
TANG 20023 0.2735 0.2558 0.0004 0.9385 0.0566 0.1981 0.4227 
MTB 19967 2.5282 2.3529 0.3000 9.5700 0.9600 1.7100 3.1300 
PROF 19849 0.0655 0.1904 -0.8162 0.4525 0.0209 0.0995 0.1638 
DEP 20015 0.0457 0.0435 0.0001 0.3004 0.0202 0.0367 0.0572 
RD 20090 0.0222 0.0786 -0.0084 2.9404 0.0000 0.0000 0.0059 
RDDum 20090 0.3142 0.4642 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
INDMED 
(BLEV) 
20090 0.1529 0.1381 0.0000 0.7308 0.0441 0.1260 0.2251 
INDMED 
(MLEV) 





In order to illustrate the consistency of our target leverage specifications with prior studies, 
we report the coefficient estimates in Panel A of Table 2 where we use a panel regression 
with both firm and year fixed effects. We also correct the standard errors for both 
heteroscedasticity and clustering (Zhou et al., 2016). We confirm that our results are 
consistent with the findings of the existing literature (An et al., 2015; Flannery & Rangan, 
2006; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012; Zhou et al., 2016). Specifically, for both book and market 
leverages, the use of debt in the target leverage increases with firm size, tangibility, 
depreciation and industry median leverage, and decreases with the profitability.  
Next, the summary statistics for estimated average target leverage during the period 1996 - 
2016 are presented in Panel B of Table 2 for both the book leverage and market leverage 
ratios. Over the sample period, the median target leverage is 0.129 for book leverage and 
0.125 for market leverage and the mean annual cross-sectional target leverage fluctuates 
between –0.099 and 0.225 for book leverage, and between – 0.038 and 0.278 for market 
leverage. Consistent with the existing literature (Frank & Goyal, 2009), the medians of both 
book and market leverages are below the target leverage.   
Panel B. Correlation coefficients of determinants of target leverage 
 





SIZE 1         
TANG 0.1598* 1        
MTB 0.0138 -0.0889* 1       
PROF 0.2488* 0.1555* 0.0996* 1      
DEP -0.0787* 0.2097* 0.1685* 0.0725* 1     
RD -0.1411* -0.1340* 0.1800* -0.2602* 0.1121* 1    
RDDum 0.0470* -0.1879* 0.1049* -0.0563* 0.0603* 0.4170* 1   
INDMED 
(BLEV) 0.1866* 0.3139* 0.0702* 0.1568* 0.2296* -0.1077* -0.1175* 1  
INDMED 




Table 2. Target capital structure estimation results 
This table presents the target capital structure regression results (Panel A)  
 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝛽̂̂𝑋𝑖,𝑡    
and reports the summary statistics of firm’s average target leverage ratio for the sample 
period from 1996 to 2016. In Panel A, the dependent variable is book leverage and market 
leverage (column 1 and 2, respectively) The first column lists each of target leverage 
determinants used in the target leverage regression. Appendix A provides detailed 
definitions and data sources for these variables. We include both firm and year fixed effect 
in regressions. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and firm clustering. 
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. The p-values are in 
parenthesis.  
Panel A. Parameter estimates from fixed-effect regressions on determinants of capital 
structure 




SIZE 0.0174*** 0.0323*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
TANG 0.109*** 0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
MTB 0.0026*** -0.0032*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) 
PROF -0.0450*** -0.108*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
DEP 0.216*** 0.235*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
RD 0.0291 -0.0035 
 (0.259) (0.886) 
RDDUM -0.0024 0.0003 
 (0.653) (0.964) 
INDMED 0.297*** 0.395*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.373*** -0.248*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 16,545 16,545 
R-squared 0.103 0.186 
Number of id 2,412 2,412 
  
Panel B. Post target estimation summary statistics 
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Target (BLEV) 16545 0.182 0.070 -0.099 0.463 0.129 0.172 0.225 





5.2. Equity liquidity and SOA: baseline results 
We present the results from the baseline regression (Eq. 12), which determines the equity 
liquidity – SOA relationship (H1), in Table 3. All these regressions are estimated using the 
two-step system GMM method. The results are presented for both book leverage (𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) 
and market leverage (𝑀𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) separately. The variables of interest in this regression are the 
interaction terms between book/market leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) and equity liquidity that is proxied 
by the Amihud illiquidity measure (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡) (Columns 1-2).  
The coefficient on the interaction terms between equity liquidity (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡) and leverage ratios 
(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) are positive and highly significant at the 1% level for both book and market leverage 
regressions. Since the relationship between equity liquidity and leverage SOA is addressed 
by the coefficients of the interaction terms of illiquidity measure and leverage, 
(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡), with the same magnitude but opposite sign, there is a negative relationship 
between the Amihud illiquidity measure and leverage SOA. However, as a low Amihud 
score is indicative of high liquidity (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Lipson & Mortal, 2009), 
our findings imply a positive link between equity liquidity and the SOA. It suggests that 
firms with high (low) liquidity have lower (higher) overall adjustment costs, which results 
in higher (lower) SOA. This is consistent with our previous discussion, which suggests that 
firms with illiquid equity would have to offer a larger discount on any new shares issued and 




Table 3. The effects of liquidity on the speed of leverage adjustment – Baseline results 
This table reposts the regression results for the effect of liquidity on the speed of adjustment 
using the two-step system GMM estimator for the following models: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1,             
Where the dependent variable (LEV) is measured by either book leverage (BLEV) or market 
leverage (MLEV). LIQ is Amihud illiquidity measure, which is defined as average ratio of 
the daily absolute stock return to its dollar volume. All the explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year relative to the dependent variable (LEV). The variable definitions are contained 
in Appendix A. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The p-values are in parenthesis.  
 
 
Regarding the economic significance, a standard deviation increase of one in liquidity 
increases the SOA by 1.18% - 4.11%, compared with an average adjustment speed of 24.1% 




   
LEV 0.6460*** 0.8330*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (-0.000) (-0.000) 
LIQ x LEV 0.0007*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
SIZE 0.0051*** 0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.525) 
TANG 0.0618*** 0.0864*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
MTB 0.0031*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
PROF 0.0358*** 0.0327*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
DEP 0.2140*** -0.0422 
 (0.000) (0.366) 
RD -0.0112 -0.0667*** 
 (0.621) (0.000) 
RDDUM -0.0051* -0.0077*** 
 (0.061) (0.001) 
INDMED 0.0662*** -0.0818*** 
 (5.456) (0.000) 
Constant -0.0308*** 0.0843*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 14,925 14,925 
Number of id 2,260 2,260 
AR(2) 0.4406 0.6778 




for book leverage and 17.9% for market leverage4. In other words, an average firm takes 
about 2.5 to 3.5 years to adjust half of the deviation between the actual and the target leverage. 
This duration decreases to about 2 to 3 years for firms with high liquidity5. In general, the 
results support our first hypothesis that liquidity boosts the leverage SOA. Firms with high 
liquidity are charged lower transaction costs in issuing financial capital and have lower 
asymmetric information that leads to lower agency costs. Consequently, such firms have a 
higher leverage SOA. 
With regard to the signs and significance levels of the control variables across models, the 
results are generally consistent with theoretical expectations and prior empirical evidence 
(An et al., 2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). In particular, firms with larger size, higher 
tangibility of assets, higher market-to-book ratios, higher profitability or lower R&D 
investments use more leverage. Meanwhile, the depreciation ratio has mixed results. 
Furthermore, as reported in Table 3, interestingly, the effect of current equity liquidity on 
next year’s leverage ratio depends on the leverage ratio of this year. Specifically, if the firm 
has a high level of leverage, the equity liquidity has a negative impact on next year’s leverage 
ratio. In other words, the higher a firm’s liquidity, the lower the firm’s leverage ratio (Frieder 
& Martell, 2006; Lipson & Mortal, 2009). However, this negative relationship shrinks with 
the reducing of the leverage level and turns positive when the leverage ratio is very low. It 
implies that at the very low level of leverage, liquid firms will take the advantage of liquidity 
to retire the equity and increase the leverage ratio. This argument is consistent with the trade-
off theory6. 
 
4 To compute the economic significance of liquidity on leverage SOA, we take the product of the coefficients 
and sample standard deviation of liquidity measure (An et al., 2015; Colak et al., 2018). 
5 The half-life time is calculated as Ln(0.5)/Ln(1-SOA).  
6 We also run the regression without the interaction term between leverage ratio and equity liquidity to see how 
equity liquidity affect next year’s leverage level. The results show that there is a negative relationship between 





We also present results of two diagnostic tests including the AR(2) second-order serial 
correlation test and the Hansen J test of over-identifying restriction. Specifically, AR(2) tests 
show the p-values of 0.4406 and 0.6778 for the book and market leverage regressions, 
respectively. These results imply that our system GMM specifications do not suffer from the 
second-order serial correlation. Further, the p-values of Hansen J tests of 0.3796 and 0.3121 
for book and market leverage regressions, respectively, confirm the validity of all our 
instruments. In sum, the results of these specifications imply that the dynamic system GMM 
model specification is appropriate.  
5.3. Robustness checks 
5.3.1. Two-step approach 
Thus far, we have shown that liquidity has positive and statistically significant impacts on 
leverage SOA using one-step approach. In this specification, following previous literature 
(Cook & Tang, 2010; Devos et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2016), we use an interaction term 
between liquidity and leverage ratio to test the significance of liquidity on SOA. However, 
given that both liquidity and the first lag of the firm’s actual leverage ratio have highly 
significant impacts on leverage ratio, this method may not fully assess whether including the 
interaction variable improves the model. In this session, we check the robustness of our 
baseline results using the two-step approach (Çolak et al., 2018; Dang et al., 2019; 
Faulkender et al., 2012).7  
 




Table 4. The effects of liquidity on the speed of leverage adjustment – Two-step 
approach 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of liquidity on the leverage speed of 
adjustment: 
∆ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗 =  𝛼0 +  (𝜕0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 +  𝛳𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑗) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑗) + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗   
The dependent variable is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗). 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑗  is the different between the target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 is proxied by Amihud. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 is the vector of control variables that includes firm size 
(Size), market to book ratio (MTB), profitability (Prof), research and development expenses 
(RD), research and development dummy (RDDum), Tangibility (Tang), Depreciation 
expenses (Dep), Industry-median leverage (INDMED). Year fixed effects are included in 
Models (1) - (2). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The variable 
definitions are in Appendix A1. 
 
In Eq. (10), 𝜕 is a measure of aggregate SOA of firms that diverge away from the target of 
the next period. The dynamic trade-off theory suggests that firms should adjust when there 




   
Dist 0.4198*** 0.4181*** 
 (8.2016) (10.1673) 
LIQ*Dist 0.0005*** 0.0009*** 
 (2.8741) (12.897) 
SIZE*DIST -0.0174*** -0.0194*** 
 (-4.5114) (-5.7574) 
TANG*DIST -0.0544* -0.0749*** 
 (-1.9463) (-2.6512) 
MTB*DIST 0.0059** 0.0008 
 (1.9725) (0.1930) 
PROF*DIST 0.1466** -0.1156** 
 (2.3782) (-2.1450) 
DEP*DIST -0.1978 0.3542 
 (-0.9407) (1.4117) 
RD*DIST -0.1771 -0.4759*** 
 (-1.4627) (-4.6397) 
RDDUM*DIST -0.0070 -0.0238 
 (-0.4121) (-1.5764) 
INDMED*DIST -0.1196** 0.1341** 
 (-2.5058) (2.2862) 
Constant -0.3225*** 0.1307*** 
 (-9.8335) (5.9600) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 15,202 15,202 




is a gap between the target and the real leverage ratios (estimated as 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ −
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) . To examine the relationship between liquidity and leverage SOA, we include 
liquidity in the regression which determines a firm’s speed of leverage adjustment. Öztekin 
and Flannery (2012) also suggest that firm accounting variables may affect both target 
leverage and SOA. We use a set of covariates that are used in the target leverage estimation 
(vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑗). Thus, 𝜕 varies with liquidity and control variables:   
𝜕 = 𝜕0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 +  𝛳𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑗                                                                                             (16) 
Substituting Eq. (16) back to Eq. (10) yields the equation for a partial adjustment model with 
heterogeneity in the leverage SOA: 
∆ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗 =  𝛼0 +  (𝜕0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 +  𝛳𝑋𝑖,𝑡,𝑗) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑗) + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗                      (17) 
where ∆ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗 =  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗 −  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡,𝑗. 
Eq. (17) includes a pooled OLS regression of leverage changes on the product of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 
and liquidity and control variables with bootstrapped standard errors to account for the 
generated regressors (Çolak et al., 2018; Faulkender et al., 2012; Pagan, 1984). 
Table 4 reports the results. The coefficients of interaction between liquidity and distance 
from target are positive and statistically significant across models, implying a positive 
relationship between liquidity and leverage SOA. This is consistent with our baseline finding.  
5.3.2. The impact of outliers 
In the baseline analyses, following the literature on dynamic capital structure, all continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to alleviate the impact of outliers 
(Dang et al., 2019; Devos et al., 2017). Classical statistics such as the mean and standard 




classical statistics by reducing the impact of extreme observations. However, as suggested 
by Tukey (1960), all of the statistical formulas are based on the assumption that the data are 
a random sample that contains all of the observed values, even extreme values. He notes that 
the tails of a distribution are extremely important, and indiscriminately modifying large and 
small values invalidates many of the statistical analyses that we take for granted.8 
In this subsection, we re-run the baseline specification with the original data that we get from 
Datastream without winsorization. The results are presented in Table 5. For brevity, only 
main coefficients of interest in examining our hypotheses are presented. Specifically, the 
coefficients on the interaction LIQ x LEV are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for both book and market leverage regressions. This indicates that our baseline findings 
that show the positive relationship between liquidity and leverage SOA (H1) are robust even 
without data adjustments. 
5.3.3. Alternative measures of leverage 
In the main analyses, both book and market leverages are used as primary measures of the 
leverage ratio (An, Li, & Yu, 2016; Öztekin, 2015). However, previous research has different 
definitions of debt (Devos et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2016). The main difference lies in whether 
we need to take only long-term debt or total debt that comprises current liability into account. 
Debt may also be re-measured to include other firm liabilities. Thus, the robustness of our 
key findings is tested by including two other definitions of corporate leverage ratio: long-
term debt to the book value of assets (LDA) and long-term debt to market value of assets 
(LDM). Details of the measurement of these alternative proxies of leverage are provided in 
Appendix A. 
 





Table 5. Robustness check: Baseline results without data winsorization 
This table reposts the regression results for the effect of liquidity on the speed of adjustment 
without data winsorization using the two-step system GMM estimator for the following 
models: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1,             
Where the dependent variable (LEV) is measured by either book leverage (BLEV) or market 
leverage (MLEV). LIQ is Amihud illiquidity measure, which is defined as average ratio of 
the daily absolute stock return to its dollar volume. All the explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year relative to the dependent variable (LEV). The variable definitions are contained 
in Appendix A. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 








   
LEV 0.6572*** 0.8049*** 
 (47.1003) (77.4424) 
LIQ -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (-3.8361) (-4.8934) 
LIQ x LEV 0.0007*** 0.0002*** 
 (5.8996) (4.3015) 
Control Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 14,925 14,925 
Number of id 2,260 2,260 
AR(2) 0.0405 0.0623 




Table 6. Robustness check: Alternative leverage measures 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of liquidity on the speed of adjustment 
using the two-step system GMM estimator for the following models: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 +  (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1,     
Where the dependent variable (LEV) is measured by either long-term book leverage (LDA) 
that is measured as long-term debt to the book value of assets or long-term market leverage 
(LDM) that is measured as long-term debt to the market value of assets. LIQ is Amihud 
illiquidity measure which is defined as average ratio of the daily absolute stock return to its 
dollar volume. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one year compared to the 
dependent variable (LEV). The variable definitions are in Appendix A. ***, **, * indicate 





   
LEV 0.7190*** 0.7040*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ -0.0001*** -0.0000 
 (0.006) (0.992) 
LIQ x LEV 0.0009*** -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.832) 
Control Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 10,938 10,938 
Number of id 1,609 1,609 
 
We tabulate the robustness test for our baseline results in Table 6. With various measures of 
financial leverage, Table 6 presents the regression results for the association between equity 
liquidity and leverage SOA (H1). Compared with the key findings from Table 3, the 
regression results in Table 6 confirm the significantly positive relationship (at the 1% level) 
between equity liquidity and leverage SOA for book leverage regression, but insignificant 
for market leverage model.  
5.3.4. Alternative measures of liquidity 
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of our main finding using alternative measures 
of equity liquidity, including zero return proportion (PropZero), turnover (Turnover) and 





Table 7. Robustness check: Alternative liquidity measures 
This tables reports the regression results for the effects of other liquidity measures including 
proportion of zero-return days, turnover, and daily quoted spread to test the association 
between equity liquidity and leverage using two-step system GMM for the following models: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1 
  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗  𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1  
  𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1   
Where the dependent variable (LEV) is measured by either book leverage (BLEV) or market 
leverage (MLEV). 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 is a liquidity measure which is the proportion of trading days 
in the year that had zero price change (zero return) from the previous day. 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is 
another measure of liquidity, which is defined as the number of shares traded on a day, 
divided by the total number of share outstanding. Spread is the daily closing percent quoted 
spread (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) as daily closing bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint spread averaged 
over the number of positive volume days. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year compared to the dependent variable (LEV). The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The p-values 
are in parenthesis. 
 
Columns 1-2, 3-4 and 5-6 report the results for PropZero, Turnover, and Spread, 
respectively. We find consistent results as in Table 3. Specifically, in columns 1-2, the 
coefficients of the interaction term 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑍𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level for both book and market leverage regressions. As PropZero is 
 PropZero Turnover Spread 












       
LEV 0.840*** 0.732*** 0.853*** 0.884*** 0.774*** 0.840*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PropZero  -0.0406 -0.0250*     
 (0.144) (0.066)     
PropZero x LEV 0.284*** 0.183***     
 (0.008) (0.001)     
Turnover   0.0081** 0.0037   
   (0.016) (0.328)   
Turnover x LEV   -0.0436*** -0.0541***   
   (0.000) (0.000)   
Spread     -0.156*** -0.176*** 
     (0.002) (0.000) 
Spread x LEV     1.168*** 0.453*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,469 15,469 14,925 14,925 16,457 16,457 




an illiquidity measure, these results confirm that liquidity has a positive impact on leverage 
SOA. Next, as a liquidity measure, the negative coefficients of the interaction term 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 also suggest a statistically significant relationship at the 1% level 
between equity liquidity and leverage SOA (columns 3-4) for both book and market leverage 
models. The results on Spread are similar which indicate a significantly positive liquidity – 
leverage SOA relation (columns 5-6) at the 1% level. These results further support our 
baseline finding (H1). 
5.4. Effect of liquidity on SOA for under- and over-levered firms 
Table 8 presents the results of estimating Eq. (12) separately for under- and over-levered 
firms for both book and market leverages to examine whether the impact of equity liquidity 
on leverage SOA differs for under- and over-levered firms (H2). We find that the coefficients 
of the interaction term between equity liquidity and the leverage ratio are significantly 
positive at the 1% level for over-levered firms where book and market values are used. 
However, these same coefficients are statistically insignificant in the case of under-levered 
firms. It implies that equity liquidity positively affects the SOA of over-levered firms but 
has no impact for under-levered firms. As explained previously, over-levered firms are most 
likely to raise equity to correct the imbalance and they are even more motivated to do so if 
they enjoy high equity liquidity. For under-levered firms, they are most likely to correct the 
imbalance by issuing debt, which is relatively unaffected by the state of the liquidity of its 
equity. The analyses on median percentage changes of equity and debt finance for under- 
and over-levered firms confirm this argument. Specifically, for liquid subsample, while the 
over-levered firms issue greater amount of equity in the long term and remain at a stable 
debt level, the under-levered firms issue very high rates of debt and relatively low rates of 




suggests the high liquidity can significantly reduce the cost of debts rather than the cost of 
equity. If this is the case, under-levered firms, which need to issue debts to adjust to their 
target leverage, should also have the significantly positive relation between liquidity and 
leverage SOA. 
Furthermore, our results show that the adjustment of under-levered firms are relatively 
smaller compared to over-levered firms. It implies that over-levered firms have either lower 
costs or larger benefits of adjusting back to the targets. Specifically, the coefficients of the 
lagged value of leverage ratios (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) that measure the SOA (1 − 𝜕) are around 0.6 for 
over-levered firms and around 0.9 for under-levered firms. This suggests an annual 
adjustment speed of around 40% for over-levered firms but only around 10% for under-
levered firms. Our results are consistent with Byoun (2008) who suggests that the costs of 
maintaining an over-levered position is much higher than those of keeping an under-levered 
position and Faulkender et al. (2012) who suggest that convergence toward targets is more 
important for over-levered firms. Despite being under-levered, such firms choose to deviate 
from their target leverage ratios to balance the future financing needs and avoid the cost of 
re-issuing and repurchasing equity.9,10 
 
9 The results of AR(2) second-order serial correlation tests and Hansen J tests of over-identifying restrictions 
indicate that the dynamic system GMM model is valid. 
10 In unreported tables, we also check the robustness of this finding using alternative measures of leverage and 
alternative measures of liquidity. The results also confirm the positive linkage between liquidity and leverage 




Table 8. The effects of liquidity on the speed of leverage adjustment for over- and 
under-levered firms 
This table reposts the regression results for the effect of liquidity on the speed of adjustment 
for over- and under-levered firms using the two-step system GMM estimator for the 
following models in two separated subsamples: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 +  (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1,         
Where the dependent variable (LEV) is measured by either book leverage (BLEV) or market 
leverage (MLEV). LIQ is Amihud illiquidity measure, which is defined as average ratio of 
the daily absolute stock return to its dollar volume. All the explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year compared to the dependent variable (LEV). The variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The p-values are in parenthesis. 
 









     
LEV 0.527*** 0.959*** 0.601*** 0.842*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
LIQ -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0008 
 (0.000) (0.298) (0.000) (0.370) 
LIQ x LEV 0.0013*** -0.0008 0.0007*** 0.0071 
 (0.000) (0.351) (0.000) (0.137) 
SIZE 0.0038*** 0.0048** 0.0070*** -0.0023 
 (0.001) (0.035) (0.000) (0.853) 
TANG 0.0478*** 0.0141 0.0991*** -0.0682 
 (0.000) (0.554) (0.000) (0.505) 
MTB 0.0041*** 0.0048 0.0057*** 0.0124 
 (0.000) (0.197) (0.000) (0.447) 
PROF -0.0014 0.0286* -0.0308*** 0.0345 
 (0.873) (0.084) (0.000) (0.847) 
DEP 0.596*** -0.184 0.0989*** -0.591 
 (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.368) 
RD 0.201*** -0.0045 -0.0517 -0.294 
 (0.002) (-0.921) (0.127) (0.429) 
RDDUM -0.0178*** -0.0023 -0.0131*** 0.0394 
 (0.000) (0.708) (0.000) (0.198) 
INDMED 0.0250** -0.212*** 0.0012 -0.1830 
 (0.030) (0.001) (0.859) (0.347) 
Constant 0.0748*** -0.0648** 0.0216** 0.0483 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.036) (0.723) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,311 8,614 5,558 9,367 
Number of id 1,507 1,714 1,493 1,782 
AR(2) 0.2002 0.3031 0.1042 0.4170 





5.5. Effect of liquidity on SOA: conditional on leverage deviation and target change 
Next, we investigate whether the positive relationship between equity liquidity and leverage 
SOA varies conditional on the low and high levels of leverage deviation (H3), and low and 
high levels of target instability (H4). Estimation results for Eq. (13-15) are reported in Table 
9. 
Panel A presents the results for the full sample. The coefficients of the interaction term 
(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) are positive and highly significantly (at the 1% level) in the case of both 
book and market leverages in all regressions (columns 1-6), implying that the equity liquidity 
has a positive effect on the leverage SOA. Columns 1 and 2 test hypothesis 3 by including 
the triple interaction term 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡. The results show that the coefficients 
on this triple interaction term are negative and highly significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that leverage deviation has a negative impact on the positive association between equity 
liquidity and SOA. Hypothesis 4 is tested in columns 3 and 4. Specifically, the coefficients 
of the triple interaction term 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡  are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, which implies that the positive relation between equity liquidity 
and leverage SOA is less pronounced for firms with higher target instability. To further 
confirm these findings, we include both triple interaction terms, 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
and 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 , in columns 5 and 6. The results confirm that both 
coefficients are significantly negative, suggesting that the impact of equity liquidity on SOA 
is greater for firms with a smaller deviation from target and a more stable target leverage 
ratio. In sum, these results suggest that larger leverage deviation and greater target instability 





Table 9. The effects of liquidity on the speed of leverage adjustment – Conditional on 
leverage deviation and target instability 
This tables reports the regression results for the effects of liquidity measures on the leverage 
SOA in high and low leverage deviation firms, and high and low instability in target, based 
on whether the firm’s leverage deviation position/instability in target is above or below the 
median for full sample and for over- and under-levered firms separately using two-step 
system GMM for the following model: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
+   𝛽6(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜕𝑗𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1 , 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
+    𝛽6(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜕𝑗𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1,       
             𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + (1 − 𝜕0)𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
+    𝛽6(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽9(𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +    𝛽10(𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜕𝑗𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1, 
Where the dependent variable (LEV) is measured by either book leverage (BLEV) or market 
leverage (MLEV). LIQ is Amihud illiquidity measure, which is defined as average ratio of 
the daily absolute stock return to its dollar volume. All the explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year compared to the dependent variable (LEV). The variable definition are in 
Appendix A. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 









 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 Both hypotheses 












       
LEV 0.7380*** 0.8020*** 0.6920*** 0.6560*** 0.8000*** 0.6210*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ -0.0005*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ x LEV 0.0024*** 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0012*** 0.0063*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
LevDev -0.0260*** 0.0176***   -0.0056*** 0.0303*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV x LevDev 0.0806*** -0.111***   0.0133*** -0.102*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ x LevDev 0.0003*** 0.0001***   0.0002*** 0.0019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ x LEV x LevDev -0.0018*** -0.0004***   -0.0008*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔTarget   -0.0040*** -0.0007 0.0135*** -0.0085** 
   (0.000) (0.818) (0.000) (0.016) 
LEV x ΔTarget   -0.0149*** 0.0642*** -0.0638*** 0.0765*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ x ΔTarget   -0.0000 0.0005*** 0.0000*** 0.0005*** 
   (0.789) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ x LEV x ΔTarget   -0.0002*** -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.0016*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.0025*** -0.0087*** 0.0022*** 0.0103*** 0.0038*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TANG 0.0337*** 0.105*** 0.0631*** 0.0422** 0.0319*** -0.0059 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.593) 
MTB 0.0006*** -0.0012*** 0.0027*** -0.0087*** 0.0011*** -0.0145*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PROF 0.0367*** 0.0125*** 0.0474*** 0.0337*** 0.0346*** -0.0190** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) 
DEP 0.0312*** 0.242*** -0.0128 0.430*** 0.0099*** 0.0558 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.385) 
RD 0.00142 -0.105*** -0.0074 -0.255*** -0.0187*** -0.292*** 
 (0.737) (0.000) (0.199) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RDDUM -0.0070*** -0.0140*** -0.0117*** 0.0256*** -0.0051*** -0.0023 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.654) 
INDMED -0.0340*** 0.0316*** 0.0437*** 0.0534*** -0.00528*** -0.0162** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) 
Constant 0.0173*** -0.0389 -0.0118 0.651 0.0079** -2.620 
 (0.000) (0.875) (0.144) (0.716) (0.041) (0.476) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,938 10,938 4,645 4,037 6,293 6,901 
Number of id 1,609 1,609 1,088 1,081 1,206 1,257 
AR(2) 0.0894 0.0137 0.4931 0.9131 0.2339 0.3835 




Panel B.  Over- levered and under-levered firms 









     
LEV 0.600*** 0.911*** 0.518*** 0.956*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQ -0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.749) (0.000) (0.220) 
LIQ x LEV 0.0012*** 0.0012 0.0007*** -0.0022 
 (0.000) (0.351) (0.000) (0.193) 
LevDev -0.0262*** 0.0222** -0.0549*** 0.0192 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.272) 
LEV x LevDev 0.0552*** -0.0995 0.0669*** -0.0444 
 (0.000) (0.111) (0.000) (0.492) 
LIQ x LevDev 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0006*** -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.666) (0.000) (0.573) 
LIQ x LEV x LevDev -0.0005*** -0.0005 -0.0006*** -0.0023 
 (0.000) (0.641) (0.000) (0.160) 
ΔTarget 0.0176*** -0.0196*** 0.0511*** -0.0022 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.816) 
LEV x ΔTarget -0.0618*** 0.0732* -0.0706*** -0.0484 
 (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.377) 
LIQ x ΔTarget 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
LIQ x LEV x ΔTarget -0.0004*** -0.0047***  -0.0004*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.0048*** 0.0040*** 0.0156*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
TANG 0.0617*** 0.0346*** 0.0684*** -0.0691*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) 
MTB 0.0033*** 0.0006 0.0014*** -0.0020 
 (0.000) (0.634) (0.000) (0.466) 
PROF 0.0053*** 0.0042 -0.2056*** 0.0263 
 (0.000) (0.708) (0.000) (0.225) 
DEP 0.103*** -0.141**   -0.0287** 0.199 
 (0.000) (0.031) (0.014) (0.120) 
RD 0.0775*** -0.0107 0.0131 -0.0305 
 (0.000) (0.596) (0.131) (0.725) 
RDDUM -0.0130*** 0.0054 -0.0102*** -0.0219** 
 (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.013) 
INDMED 0.0087*** -0.0676*** 0.0770*** -0.109** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.033) 
Constant 0.0527*** -0.410*** 0.8255*** -0.241 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.941) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,645 6,293 4,037 6,901 
Number of id 1,088 1,206 1,081 1,257 
AR(2) 0.1940 0.2438 0.139 0.2005 
P-value Hansen test 1.0000 0.0779 0.421 0.1756 
 
We further consider the impact of leverage deviation and target stability on the equity 
liquidity-SOA relationship for over- and under-levered subsamples. We re-run Eq. (15) and 




over-levered firms. We continue to find that equity liquidity has a positive effect on leverage 
SOA for over-levered firms as shown by the highly statistically significant and positive signs 
of the coefficients on the interaction term 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 . This relationship, though, is 
weaker for firms with higher leverage deviation and/or higher instability in target levels, as 
shown by the significantly negative coefficients (at the 1% level) on the triple interaction 
terms 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  and 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 𝛥𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 . The results for under-
levered firms are shown in columns 2 and 4 of panel B. Again, consistent with hypothesis 2, 
we find that equity liquidity has no significant effect on leverage SOA of under-levered 
firms.11 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate how equity liquidity, along with the deviation from target 
leverage ratio and the instability of that target, affects the behavior of a firm’s SOA. Based 
on a sample of more than 2,000 UK firms over the period from 1996 to 2016, we find a 
positive association between equity liquidity and leverage SOA, indicating that firms with 
high equity liquidity adjust more quickly to their targets. This important finding proves to 
be robust to a battery of checks, including alternative empirical methods, alternative samples 
without data adjustment, and alternative proxies for leverage ratios and equity liquidity. 
Most importantly, we find that the positive impact of equity liquidity on SOA is confined to 
over-levered firms: over-levered firms tend to quickly adjust to their target ratio and this 
trend is further enhanced for firms with higher equity liquidity; under-levered firms adjust 
slower to their target ratio and this is unaffected by their equity liquidity. We further observe 
that both the leverage deviation and the target instability have a negative impact on the 
 
11 We also check the robustness of these results using alternative measures of leverage and alternative measures 
of liquidity in unreported tables. The results confirm that the positive association between equity liquidity and 




strength of the relationship between equity liquidity and the SOA. Indeed, for firms with 
both a large leverage deviation and a large target change, any positive impact that equity 
liquidity has on their SOA is almost eliminated. 
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, given the theoretical prediction 
and empirical evidence that equity liquidity and leverage SOA may be related, we are the 
first to enrich the literature on leverage adjustments by identifying equity liquidity as a new 
determinant of SOA. We further investigate the distinct impact of equity liquidity on 
leverage SOA for under- and over-levered firms. Moreover, whilst several studies have 
examined the capital structure choices of UK firms but do not investigate the dynamic 
leverage adjustments, our study contributes to the empirical literature on the association 
between equity liquidity and firms’ capital structure decisions in the UK. Next, we provide 
new empirical evidence of the joint effect of equity liquidity, leverage deviation and target 
instability on leverage SOA. The positive impact on equity liquidity on the SOA is greater 
for firms that are relatively close to their target and whose target is relatively stable. 
We will end with an outline of areas for further research. Our study examines the impact of 
liquidity on leverage SOA in the UK market. In the future, our study could thus be extended 
in other markets in the different stock trading mechanisms such as pure order-driven trading 
system with the absence of market makers, or emerging markets that rely less on capital 
market financing. This is, therefore, desirable for future research to consider. Moreover, the 
observation is that our findings suggest that firms in an under-levered position display only 
a weak propensity to move back to their target ratios. Another important topic for future 
analysis would involve a closer examination of what drives the different behaviors of over- 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variables Acronym Description Data 
source 
A. Firm-level variable     
A.1. Leverage  LEV     
Book leverage BLEV Book value of total debt divided by book value 
of total assets 
WorldScope 
Market leverage MLEV Book value of total debt divided by the sum of 




book value of 
asset 
LDA Long-term debt to the book value of asset WorldScope 
Long-term debt-
market value of 
asset 
LDB Long-term debt to the market value of asset WorldScope 
A2. Liquidity variables     
Amihud 
illiquidity 
LIQ Ratio of the daily absolute stock return to its 
dollar volume averaged over the number of 




PropZero Proportion of trading days in the year that had 
zero price change (zero return) from the 
previous day  
Datastream 
Turnover Turnover The number of shares traded on a day, divided 
by the total number of share outstanding. The 
turnover for each stock, for each year, is 
calculated as the average turnover across all 





Spread Daily closing bid-ask spread divided by the 
midpoint spread averaged over the number of 





A3. Target leverage 
variables 
    
Leverage 
deviation 
LevDev Absolute difference between target and 
observed leverage ratio 
Self-
calculated 
Target change ΔTarget Difference between target leverage of this 
period and target leverage of last period 
Self-
calculated 
A4. Other firm-level 
characteristics 
    
Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of book value of total assets WorldScope 
Tangibility TANG Net property, plant and equipment dividend by 




MTB Ratio of book value of assets less book value of 
equity plus market value of equity to book 
value of assets 
WorldScope 
Profitability PROF Earning before interests, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization divided by book value of 
assets 
WorldScope 
Depreciation DEP Depreciation and amortization divided by book 




RD Research and development expenses divided by 





RDDUM Dummy variable that equals to one if research 
and development expenses are not reported and 
zero otherwise 
WorldScope 
B. Industry-level variable     
Industry median 
of leverage 
INDMED The median leverage ratio of an industry to 



























































































































































Corporate sustainability performance and corporate leverage adjustments 
 
Chapter 3 consists of one research paper entitled “The effect of corporate sustainability 
performance on leverage adjustments”. The paper has been published in The British Accounting 
Review (SSCI and ABDC-rank A*). The paper investigates the association between CSP and 
leverage SOA using a large sample of 31 countries from 2002 to 2018. Using two proxies of 
CSP, the paper suggests that firms with superior CSP tend to adjust faster toward their target 
leverage ratios. It further explores the potential underlying economic mechanisms through 
which CSP affects leverage adjustments addressing information asymmetry reduction, 
stakeholder engagements enhancement, pushing up stock prices in the stock market, and 
competitive advantages improvement in the product market. The positive association between 
CSP and leverage adjustment speed is less pronounced in countries with high-quality 
institutions. Findings of the paper remain statistically and quantitatively unchanged after further 






































































































Employment protection laws and corporate leverage adjustments 
 
Chapter 4 consists of one submitted research paper entitled “OECD labour protection and 
dynamic leverage adjustments.” The paper has been submitted for review and publication and 
is currently under the first-round review by Management Science (SSCI and ABDC-rank A*). 
This paper investigates the link between employment protection laws (EPLs) and leverage 
speed of adjustments. Using data of 19 OECD countries, the paper suggests that the stringency 
of EPLs negatively and significantly affect leverage SOA. The effect remains valid after a series 
of tests for endogeneity and robustness checks. Further analysis suggests that the negative 






OECD Labour Protection and Dynamic Leverage Adjustments  
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of employment protection laws (EPLs) on the speed of 
corporate leverage adjustments. By exploiting within-country changes in EPLs across 19 
OECD founding countries/members, we find that an increase in the stringency of EPLs 
significantly decreases leverage adjustment speeds. This association is consistent with the view 
that stringent EPLs raise firms’ costs of adjustment on target leverage. Our result survives 
several tests addressing the endogeneity concern and is robust to a battery of robustness checks. 
We further demonstrate that the response of leverage adjustment to changes in EPLs is more 
pronounced in countries with effective legal enforcement. Generally, our results are consistent 
with the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure. 
Keywords: Employment protection laws, legal enforcement, leverage adjustment, dynamic 
trade-off theory. 





As one of the most dominant views of capital structure, the traditional trade-off theory argues 
that firms have optimal leverage ratios that balance the benefits (i.e. tax shield) and the costs 
(i.e. financial distress or bankruptcy costs) of debts (Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984; Brennan & 
Schwartz, 1978). Subsequently, the empirical studies indicate that in the dynamic framework, 
firms have an incentive to adjust back to their optimal capital structure (Hennessy & Whited, 
2005; Titman & Tsyplakov, 2007). However, this convergence encounters considerable costs 
as financing frictions that reduce the leverage’s speed of adjustment (SOA). Accordingly, 
researchers have devoted substantial effort to understanding the elements that impact firms’ 
leverage adjustment speed. Many of the prior studies focus mainly on the importance of firm-
level factors on leverage adjustments such as cash flows (Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, & 
Smith, 2012), corporate governance (Chang, Chou, & Huang, 2014), crash risk (An, Li, & Yu, 
2015), debt covenants (Devos, Rahman, & Tsang, 2017), and news media coverage (Dang, 
Dang, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Zhang, 2019). Some recent literature has examined the impacts 
of country-level determinants such as macroeconomic conditions (Cook & Tang, 2010), 
institutional arrangements (Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), and political uncertainty (Çolak, 
Gungoraydinoglu, & Öztekin, 2018). To date, however, the literature has largely ignored the 
importance of the legal framework related to an important nonfinancial stakeholder, namely 
employees, in determining leverage adjustments. Given that labour is a key factor of production 
that affects corporate performance, and that the ability to adopt labour regulations is essential 
for many aspects of firms’ operation such as innovation (Acharya, Baghai, & Subramanian, 
2013, 2014), costs of financing (Alimov, 2015; Chen, Kacperczyk, & Ortiz-Molina, 2011), 
capital structure (Simintzi, Vig, & Volpin, 2015), cash holding (Cui, John, Pang, & Wu, 2018; 
Karpuz, Kim, & Ozkan, 2020), an analysis of firms’ leverage adjustments in conjunction with 




To explore how changes in labour regulations impact firms’ leverage SOA, we develop two 
competing hypotheses based on the growing literature that examines the essential roles of 
labour market mechanisms on firms’ financing decisions. On the one hand, the stringency of 
labour regulations limits the flexibility to adjust the workforce, and thus, increases labour 
adjustment costs and reduces operating flexibility of corporations. As such, rigid labour laws 
may distort investment and production decisions, and negatively impact corporate performance 
and growth (Autor, Kerr, & Kugler, 2007; Hirsch, 1991). Consequently, strict EPLs associate 
with greater distress risks and higher costs of external capital (Alimov, 2015; Chen et al., 2011; 
Cui, John, Pang, & Wu, 2018). Previous literature also suggests that firms are likely to reserve 
the information asymmetry when their employees have more protection (Belkhir, Ben-Nasr, & 
Boubaker, 2016; Hilary, 2006; Scott, 1994). This, in turn, increases firms’ agency costs and 
costs of leverage adjustment. Therefore, we hypothesize that strong EPLs promote firms’ 
leverage adjustment costs and reduce leverage SOA.  
On the other hand, one can argue that the strong labour regulation may protect creditors’ wealth 
by deterring firms from taking high-risk investments and making corporate takeovers (Pagano 
& Volpin, 2005; Warga & Welch, 1993). Additionally, firms’ productivity and innovation can 
be improved in an environment with stricter EPLs through worker training, selection, hiring, 
and retention (Acharya et al., 2013, 2014; Belot, Boone, & Van Ours, 2007; Poschke, 2009). 
Countries with stringent EPLs usually have more friendly political environments for workers 
that may help large firms in occasions of financial distress. In sum, stringent employment 
protections can lower firms’ financial risks, and thus, lower the cost of external financing so 
enabling firms to adjust more quickly toward their target leverage. 
To test these opposing hypotheses, we use the EPL index developed by the Organization for 




2007 period. As our empirical analysis implies a dynamic capital structure model, we follow 
the recent literature to adopt a two-step regression method (Çolak et al., 2018; Dang et al., 2019). 
Specifically, in the first step, we measure the optimal capital structure and calculate the distance 
from such optimal level. In the second step, we estimate the partial adjustment model and 
explore whether the stringency of EPLs has significant impacts on leverage SOA.  
Our baseline results show that when labour protection becomes more stringent in a country, 
firms operating in that country adjust more slowly to their target leverage ratios. Economically, 
a one-standard-deviation increase in EPL index decreases leverage SOA by 1.2 - 2.8 percent, 
compared with an average adjustment speed of 20.5 percent. Our results are robust when using 
alternative measures of EPLs including the proxies developed by Botero, Djankov, Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004), Allard (2005), and Aleksynska and Schindler (2011). 
They are also insensitive to an alternative measure of leverage that reflects the active component 
of leverage adjustments. The robustness of our results is also confirmed by using alternative 
subsamples of countries that include and remove United Kingdom and Japan, as well as for 
multinational and non-multinational firms’ subsamples. Generally, our evidence lends strong 
support to our first hypothesis that the stringency of labour regulations lowers firms’ leverage 
SOA. 
We use three strategies to address the endogeneity concerns. First, we employ an instrumental 
variable approach using legal origin as an instrument for labour protection (Botero et al., 2004). 
The results also show that when a country’s labour laws become more stringent, firms adjust 
more slowly to their target leverage. Next, to explore the causal relationship between the 
stringency of labour regulations and leverage SOA, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) to 
examine the different effects of labour regulation’s stringency across industries with different 




on leverage SOA, then this association should be more pronounced in industries that require a 
naturally higher labour turnover. The results are consistent with our expectation. Finally, to 
further alleviate the potential omitted-variable concern, we control for additional variables to 
capture potential confounding impacts that may be biasing our results. Generally, while we 
cannot completely exclude endogeneity, these results jointly indicate that our main finding is 
unlikely to be driven by this potential issue. 
We next examine the impact of the effectiveness of a country’s legal enforcement on the 
association between legal regulations and leverage SOA. Since labour laws have weak 
compliance and are not fully enforced in countries with weak legal systems (Rutkowski & 
Scarpetta, 2005), the leverage SOA may be less sensitive to changes in labour laws in such 
countries. Using five proxies for the quality of enforcement suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), we find that in countries where laws are well enforced, 
the negative impact of labour regulation’s stringency on leverage SOA is more pronounced.  
We then extend our analysis in several ways to provide further empirical support. We first 
examine the relative importance of each of the components of the overall EPL index for firms’ 
leverage adjustment. Our results show that an increase in the stringency of labour regulation 
afforded to temporary workers tends to lower firms’ leverage SOA while the impact of EPL 
index for regular workers on leverage SOA is relatively weaker. Further investigations indicate 
that stronger labour protection decreases the leverage SOA more severely for firms with greater 
financial constraints, as they find it harder to access the external capital markets.  
Our study contributes to a growing literature that explores the impacts of labour market 
mechanisms on various corporate decisions, such as investment activities (Acharya et al., 2013, 
2014; Dessaint, Golubov, & Volpin, 2017), governance (Atanassov & Kim, 2009), financing 




al., 2015), and liquidity management (Cui, John, Pang, & Wu, 2018; Karpuz et al., 2020). 
Specifically, our study provides novel cross-country empirical evidence on the negative and 
significant role played by a country’s labour protection in determining firms’ optimal capital 
structure decisions. Given the important influences of a country’s policies related to workforce 
on economic agents, our empirical study provides valuable intuitions on policy implications for 
the corporate sector. 
Further, our study adds to the dynamic capital structure literature. The recent literature has 
investigated various determinants of leverage SOA. At the firm level, the speed that firms 
converge toward their target leverage is affected by cash flow elements (Faulkender et al., 2012), 
crash risks (An et al., 2015), debt governance (Devos et al., 2017), news media coverage (Dang 
et al., 2019), and equity liquidity (Ho, Lu, & Bai, 2020). At the macro- and country level, the 
determinants of leverage SOA include the macroeconomic conditions (Cook & Tang, 2010), 
institutional features (Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), and political uncertainty (Çolak et al., 2018). 
Adding to this large body of research, we find that labour protection laws are a new and 
important factor that firms take into account in determining the leverage adjustments.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a brief review of related literature 
and develops main hypotheses. Section 3 presents variable constructions, data and sample, as 
well as discusses the empirical models and summary statistics. Section 4 reports the results. 
Section 5 provides further analyses and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Relationship between employment protection laws and leverage adjustments 
This section summarizes the literature on dynamic leverage adjustments, discusses a prediction 
on how the stringency of EPLs reduces the speed at which firms adjust toward their target levels, 
and outlines the roles of the country’s institutions in reshaping the leverage adjustment 




2.1. Dynamic leverage adjustments 
From the prominent study by Modigliani and Miller (1958), a large body of research has 
attempted to examine one of the major perspectives of capital structure, the trade-off theory. 
The early static trade-off models claim that firms identify their own target leverage ratios that 
balance the costs (for example: financial distress and bankruptcy costs) and benefits (for 
example: corporate income tax savings) of debt (Bradley et al., 1984; Fischer, Heinkel, & 
Zechner, 1989; Strebulaev, 2007). Recent empirical dynamic trade-off models follow such 
theoretical research and propose that in the long run, firms try to reach their target leverage 
levels to maximize the firm value (Byoun, 2008; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Titman & 
Tsyplakov, 2007).  
A recent stream of research has attempted to examine how quickly firms re-converge with their 
target leverage. It shows that this speed depends on the magnitude of the adjustment cost. The 
trade-off theory suggests that with zero adjustment costs, firms should not deviate from their 
target leverage levels. At the other extreme, if adjustment costs are infinite, firms should never 
move back to their targets. Supporting this view, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) suggest that 
high transaction cost reduces firms’ leverage SOA. Strebulaev (2007) also shows that firms 
with higher underwriting and management costs have lower SOA whereas Altınkılıç and 
Hansen (2000) argue that firms with high security issuance costs adjust their leverage less 
frequently. 
Recent empirical studies focus on a number of determinants of firms’ speed of leverage 
adjustment. At the firm level, Chang et al. (2014) and Liao, Mukherjee, and Wang (2015) show 
that strong corporate governance improves the leverage SOA. Elsas, Flannery, and Garfinkel 
(2014) suggest that firms that finance more major investment activities find it easier to issue 




Öztekin (2012) find that equity mispricing affects the leverage SOA and this impact is 
conditional on the deviation of actual leverage from the target level. Uysal (2011) shows that 
firms that plan and structure for acquisitions adjust faster to their targets. Dang et al. (2019) 
suggest the impact of media coverage on leverage SOA is via two mechanisms: information 
dissemination and monitoring. Most recently, Ho et al. (2020) find that firms with high equity 
liquidity significantly promote leverage SOA. At the country level, Cook and Tang (2010) 
indicate that firms that operate in good economic conditions will adjust faster than firms in poor 
economic conditions. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) further show that institutional settings with 
high default risks and high-expected bankruptcy costs will boost firms’ adjustment speed. 
Öztekin and Flannery (2012) and Öztekin (2015) show that better institutional environments 
enhance leverage SOA. Finally, Çolak et al. (2018) conclude that firms in countries with high 
political uncertainty have low leverage SOA. Nevertheless, we note that this strand of research 
has not studied whether and how the EPLs’ stringency impacts leverage adjustments. 
2.2. Employment protection laws and leverage adjustments 
Based on a growing body of literature that examines the important roles of labour market 
mechanisms on firms’ financing decisions, we develop two competing hypotheses regarding 
the impact of EPLs on firms’ capital structure adjustment. On the one hand, we predict a 
positive association between labour regulations and leverage SOA. First, by limiting firms’ 
flexibility to adjust the level of workforce, EPLs increase labour adjustment costs and reduce 
operating flexibility of corporations. As a result, stricter EPLs may distort firms’ investment 
and production decisions, and adversely affect firms’ performance and growth. As such, severer 
labour laws associate with greater distress risks, hence, higher capital transaction costs. A 
number of empirical studies provide evidence that supports this conjecture. Ruback and 




negatively affects earnings and the market value of USA firms. Autor et al. (2007) show that 
the adoption of wrongful discharge protection reduces firms’ productivity and technical 
efficiency. Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) and Simintzi et al. (2015) argue that the increase 
in employment protection increases firms’ fixed labour costs, which leads to greater costs of 
financial distress and a reduction in leverage. Serfling (2016) shows that due to the adoption of 
the good-faith expectation, firms are less likely to lay off their employees, leading to a decline 
in earnings, less persistence in profitability, and changes in earnings becoming more sensitive 
to changes in sales. As such, these firms have greater financial distress costs, higher operating 
leverage, and lower financial leverage. Cui, John, Pang, Wu, and Finance (2018) and Karpuz 
et al. (2020) suggest that strict EPLs make firing and hiring employees more difficult; this 
increases the fixed wage claims for the firms and leads to higher distress costs. Belkhir et al. 
(2016) find that stricter EPLs are likely to be increasing the conflicts between well-protected 
labour and creditors. Specifically, legally empowered labour can participate in disruptive labour 
behaviour that may increase firms’ default risk. Further, in the event of default, these workers 
can make a reclamation of collateral by creditors and the liquidation of the corporations harder 
and more costly. Consequently, the capability of creditors to enforce debt contracts is 
potentially compromised by stringent EPLs. Similarly, Alimov (2015) shows that in countries 
with stringent labour regulations, banks offer loans with higher spreads and tighter non-price 
contract terms, thus reducing firms’ ability to raise debt financing. Chen et al. (2011) find that 
powerful labour unions increase firms’ operating leverage making labour stock adjustment 
more costly. These unions also frequently intervene in firms’ restructurings, for instance by 
blocking plant closures, thereby increasing physical capital stock adjustment costs. As a result, 
powerful unions potentially reduce corporate operating flexibility, and thus increase firms’ 




reduce firms’ operating flexibility, which increases firms’ financial distress costs, and thus 
increases financing transaction costs and costs of capital. 
Furthermore, stringent labour regulations can affect leverage adjustment by increasing 
information asymmetry. Previous literature suggests that to avoid employees extracting more 
resources, firms are likely to preserve the information asymmetry when their employees have 
a strong bargaining power. Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) find that wages and benefits for 
production labour significantly increase when firms provide more information on financial 
conditions, productivity, and relative standing on the labour market such as financial statements, 
production costs, sales, investments, and future strategies. Scott (1994) shows that firms are 
likely to constrain their information disclosure on pension plans when they face a greater 
likelihood of strikes. Hilary (2006) suggests that disclosing information weakens firms’ 
position in collective bargaining. Therefore, firms with strong organized labour have an 
incentive to maintain high asymmetric information with outsiders. Firms which are facing 
organized labour have high bid-ask spreads, high probability of informed trading, low trading 
volume, and low analyst coverage. Most recently, Belkhir et al. (2016) argue that strong labour 
protection regulations negatively affect the maturity structure of debt by preserving a greater 
environment of information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders. Overall, the 
studies above indicate that strong EPLs can increase the level of information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed market participants, which increases agency costs. In turn, 
this promotes firms’ leverage adjustment costs and reduces leverage SOA (Çolak et al., 2018; 
Öztekin, 2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). 
Taking these arguments together, we argue that stringent EPLs can increase firms’ leverage 




information asymmetry of firms. Thus, strict EPLs should impede the speed at which firms 
adjust toward target leverage levels. Consequently, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
H1a. Stringent EPLs are associated with lower leverage SOAs. 
An alternative view emphasizes that the stringent EPLs may not have a negative impact on 
firms’ leverage SOA. Instead, stringent EPLs may even facilitate leverage adjustments. 
Specifically, in a stringent EPL environment, employees may be hired with an expectation of 
higher job security and longer term of employment, which lowers firms’ credit risk for the 
following reasons. First, the strong labour regulation may protect creditors’ wealth. For instance, 
with stronger negotiating positions, labour unions might deter firms from making investments 
that boost firms’ distress risk and threaten both the unionized workers’ wage premium and 
lenders’ debt payments. Stricter labour laws could discourage corporate takeovers that place 
both the employees (Pagano & Volpin, 2005) and bondholders (Warga & Welch, 1993) at risk. 
Second, firms’ productivity and innovation can be improved in an environment with stricter 
EPLs through worker training, selection, hiring, and retention. Belot et al. (2007) find that 
employees who work in great job protection environments can invest more into the firms’ 
human capital, significantly improving firms’ productivity. Poschke (2009) suggests that 
employment protection promotes exit of low-productivity firms and strengthens the market 
selection process. Acharya et al. (2013) examine country-level changes in dismissal laws in the 
USA, UK, France, and Germany and find that more rigorous dismissal laws enhance firms’ 
innovation, specifically in innovation-intensive industries. In the same stream, Acharya et al. 
(2014) show that by reducing the employer’s possibility to hinder workers after successful 
innovation, wrongful discharge laws foster workers’ innovative efforts, foster innovation and 
new firm creation. Finally, Alimov (2015) shows that countries with stringent EPLs usually 




are more likely to apply substantial political pressure on their governments to bail them out in 
events of financial distress. In general, the arguments above suggest that stringent labour laws 
can lower firms’ financial risks and thus lower costs of external financing. As a result, strong 
EPLs should enable firms to adjust more quickly toward their target leverage.  
We propose the following hypothesis to reflect this view: 
H1b. Stringent EPLs are associated with higher leverage SOAs. 
2.3. Impacts of a country’s institutions 
It is important to note that the association between formal labour protection laws and leverage 
SOA is likely to be conditional on the effectiveness of litigation in a country. Specifically, since 
formal laws can be observed or ignored to varying degrees, even very stringent regulations 
embedded in EPLs may be less effective if the country’s legal systems are not well enforced. 
OECD (2004) shows that it is essential to distinguish EPLs from the practice that associates 
with the enforcement dimension; thereby, they suggest that a country’s law enforcement has to 
be taken into account when the extent of EPLs is discussed. Rutkowski and Scarpetta (2005) 
also confirm that labour regulations are weak compliance and not fully enforced in countries 
with weak legal systems. Hence, we posit that a weak system of legal enforcement can mitigate 
the impact of EPLs on the speed of corporate leverage adjustment.  
H2. The relationship between EPLs and leverage SOA is less pronounced among firms in 




3. Data and empirical design 
This section defines the variable construction used in the empirical analysis, the data sources 
we use to collect various firm, industry, and country characteristics, and our sample selection 
procedure. 
3.1. Variable construction 
3.1.1. Leverage measures 
The evidence on whether to use book value or market value of debt in calculating firm leverage 
ratio is not clear in capital structure studies. Fama and French (2002) find that firms’ leverage 
ratio should be measured using book value of debt since this ratio is only impacted on by 
elements that are directly controlled by firms. However, Welch (2004) argues that market 
leverage ratio is more suitable to represent the agency problem between shareholders and 
creditors. In this study, we measure our dependent variable, leverage, using both the book ratio 
(𝐵𝐿) and the market ratio (𝑀𝐿), as it is likely that several firms have book leverage rather than 
market leverage and vice versa (An et al., 2015; Chang et al., 2014; Cook & Tang, 2010; 
Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Ho et al., 2020; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). Specifically, book 
leverage is calculated as the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. 
Market leverage is defined as the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the market 
value of equity and the book value of total debt.  
3.1.2. Employment protection indicators 
In this study, we measure the strictness of EPLs using the EPL index produced on the yearly 
basis by the OCED. Since the seminal paper of Lazear (1990), the EPL index developed by the 
OECD has been used widely in the literature as a proxy for the level of worker protection in a 




2015). The OECD constructs this EPL index each year for all member countries by surveying 
a wide variety of legislations involving the length of the written notice period, amount of 
severance payment provisions, and the administrative requirements when a firm decides to 
dismiss an employee. Consequently, the OECD scores these categories for each country and 
combines these scores into sub-indicator EPL indices for regular workers (EPR) and temporary 
workers (EPT) and summary indices. The values of all indices range from zero to six, with a 
higher score being the more stringent legal employment protection environment. Following 
most recent studies (Karpuz et al., 2020; Levine et al., 2020), in the baseline regression, we 
measure the rigidity of a country’s labour market using a summary index based on the average 
of the sub-indicators for regular (EPR) and temporary workers (EPT). 
However, to ensure that our results are robust, we also use various alternative measures of EPLs. 
First, we include the EPL index developed by Allard (2005) (EPLA) that extends the OECD 
indicator of employment protection. This index ranges from zero to six and does not treat all 
law changes equally. Next, we use the collective relations law index (CRLI), social security 
laws index (SSLI), and employment laws index (ELI) constructed by Botero et al. (2004). The 
CRLI comprises collective relations’ laws that protect employees through collective actions. 
The SSLI reflects pensions, sickness and healthcare coverage, and unemployment covering of 
employees. The ELI addresses the incremental cost to firms if they deviate from a rigid contract 
in which the conditions of employment are specified for all employees and no employee can be 
fired. Finally, we use unemployment coverage (UNEC) constructed by Aleksynska and 
Schindler (2011) that provides information on the generosity of unemployment benefits. All of 
these alternative measures are used in previous literature (Belkhir et al., 2016; Karpuz et al., 




3.1.3. Institutional enforcement variables 
A strong system of legal enforcement could enhance the compliance of EPLs in a country. 
Following the previous literature (An, Li, & Yu, 2016; Öztekin, 2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 
2012), we draw the enforcement variables from La Porta et al. (1998) including five proxies: 
efficiency of the judicial system (EFFJUD) that measures the efficiency and integrity of the 
country’s legal environment; rule of law (RULLAW) that represents the law and order tradition 
in the country; level of corruption (CORRUP) that denotes the corruption level of the 
government in the country; risk of expropriation (RISEXP) that indicates the risk of “outright 
confiscation” or “forced nationalization”; and the likelihood of contract repudiation by the 
government (RISCON).  
3.1.4. Control variables 
The previous literature in leverage adjustment (An et al., 2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012) 
suggests that firm and macroeconomic characteristics may affect both target leverage and 
leverage adjustment speed. In this study, we control for a set of firm-level and macroeconomic-
level characteristics. Specifically, we include firm size (SIZE) measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets, tangibility (TANG) as fixed assets as a proportion of total assets, 
profitability (PROF) as earnings before interest and taxes as a proportion of total assets, 
research and development (R&D) expenses (RD) as R&D expenses as a proportion of total 
assets, R&D dummy (RDDUM) as a dummy variable that equals one if a firm reports R&D 
expenses and zero otherwise, depreciation expenses (DEP) as depreciation expenses as a 
proportion of total assets, market-to-book ratio (MTB) as the market-to-book ratio of a firm’s 
assets, the industry median leverage ratio (INDMED) as the median debt ratio of a firm’s Fama 
and French (1997) industry classification, a country’s inflation rate (INFL), and the country’s 




3.2. Data and sample 
We obtain data from various sources during our sample period of 1985 to 200712. First, the firm 
financial data for each country is obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope via the 
Datastream database. Second, in order to estimate the stringent of EPLs, we retrieve data on 
labour protection from OECD database (Botero et al. (2004); Allard (2005); and Aleksynska 
and Schindler (2011). Third, we collect the inflation rate and GDP growth rate from the World 
Development Indicators, and data on macro-level institutional environments from La Porta et 
al. (1998). We retain only firms with common securities. We also exclude firms with special 
features, such as warrants, trusts, funds, and non-equity stocks. Financial and utility firms are 
eliminated since these firms are subject to special regulations on financing policies. To reduce 
short panel bias, we eliminate firms that do not have data for at least two consecutive years. We 
winsorize both the dependent and independent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
mitigate the potential impact of extreme values. Our final sample consists of 85,467 firm-year 
observations from 19 European countries over the period from 1985 to 2007.13 
3.3. Main regression specification 
This study examines the impact of the stringency of EPLs on leverage adjustment. Prior 
literature in capital structure dynamics suggests that a firm’s target leverage is a function of the 
firm’s time-varying characteristics, industrial elements, and macro-level variables (An et al., 
2015; Dang et al., 2019; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). We model a firm’s target leverage as 
follows: 
 
12 The OECD’s EPL index is available from 1985 to 2013. We stop in 2007 to avoid the severe structural shock 
that the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis represent to both financial leverage and 
employment regulations (Dessaint et al., 2017; Karpuz et al., 2020; Simintzi et al., 2015). 
13 Basically, the countries included in our sample are the founding countries of the OECD. There are four countries 
that are excluded because of the data availability: Iceland, Luxemburg, Portugal, and Turkey. US is also excluded 
as the EPL index of this country does not vary during the analysed period while the number of observations of this 





∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                                                                                                        (1)  
where 𝛽 is the coefficient vector and 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a set of variables including firm size, tangibility, 
profitability, research and development (R&D) expenses, an R&D dummy, depreciation 
expenses, market-to-book ratio, the industry median leverage ratio, inflation rate, and GDP 
growth rate. 
Depending on the benefits and costs of rebalancing their leverage ratio, firms evaluate the speed 
that they adjust toward the target leverage (𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1
∗ ) from their current positions (𝐿𝑖,𝑡,𝑗+1):  
𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1  −  𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = ∧𝑗 (𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1
∗  − 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) +  𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                                               (2) 
Substituting Eq. (1) to Eq. (2) and rearranging them, yields:  
𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 = (∧ 𝛽)𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + (1 −∧)𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                                                    (3) 
The speed of leverage adjustment (∧) allows firm 𝑖 in a specific country 𝑗 that diverges from 
the target to adjust partially back to their target during the next period. Such adjustment speed, ∧, 
should range from zero to one as firms make efforts to reach the target leverage ratio. However, 
market frictions cause costly adjustments. Therefore, the gap between the target and real 
leverage ratios should decrease over time (hereafter called “the distance from target” and 
estimated as 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐿𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡) . While the leverage adjustment speed ∧  in Eq. (3) is 
constant for all firms in a specific country, to test our hypotheses we allow the stringency of 
EPLs to affect the firm’s SOA toward its target ratio. Thus, ∧ varies with the stringency of EPLs 
and control variables:   
∧𝑖,𝑗,𝑡= 𝛾 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                                                                                            (4) 




Substituting Eq. (4) back to Eq. (3) yields the equation for a partial adjustment model with 
heterogeneity in the leverage SOA: 
𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 −  𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = (𝛾𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)(𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  − 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                      (5)       
This can be further simplified to yield: 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝛾𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜑𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                                               (6) 
which can be written as 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  𝛾(𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜑 (𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                       (7) 
The impact of the strictness of EPLs on leverage SOA is captured by the coefficient (𝛾) on the 
interaction term between EPLs and the distance from target. Following previous studies (Dang 
et al., 2019; Faulkender et al., 2012), we adopt a two-stage procedure to estimate Eq. (7). In the 
first stage, we estimate Eq. (3) country by country, controlling for firm fixed effects and year 
fixed effects to capture the unobserved heterogeneity across time and across firms, using system 
GMM to obtain an estimate of target leverage using Eq. (1) and each firm’s distance from target 
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡). In the second stage, we estimate this model using pooled ordinary least squares 
(pooled OLS). We note that because the distance from target, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, is generated from the 
first stage rather than observed, the estimation in the second stage is subject to the well-known 
generated regressors issue, in which the estimated standard errors may be incorrect (Pagan, 
1984). Therefore, we estimate this model using bootstrapped standard errors. We also control 
for country and year fixed effects to ensure that the results reflect average within-country 





3.4. Summary statistics 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the EPR (dotted line) and EPT (solid line) index scores for each 
country in our sample. It shows that the stringency of EPR and EPT index differs not just across 
countries but also within country for the majority of countries. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, and Netherlands reduced the strictness of labour protection. Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, and Norway are examples of countries that restructured their regulation more than once. 
Canada and Switzerland are countries that did not amend their EPLs.  
Table 1 reports the number of observations and summarizes the descriptive statistics of our key 
variables for each country and for the whole sample. In general, the sample coverage varies 
across countries. The summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables are similar to 
those in prior studies. For instance, the mean of book leverage in our study is 0.216 compared 
to 0.223 in Dang et al. (2019) and 0.24 in Öztekin and Flannery (2012). With regards to EPL 
index, the mean score in our sample is 1.60, with the most stringent labour regulation being in 
Greece (3.42), followed by Italy (3.16), and Spain (3.01). An average firm in the sample has 
total assets (book value) of $170 million, an asset tangibility ratio of 0.32, a profitability ratio 
of 0.07, an R&D ratio of 0.013, and a depreciation ratio of 0.04.14 
 
14 An unreported correlation table shows that there is no evidence that explanatory variables are highly correlated. 





Figure 1. Time variation in the stringency of employment protection for workers with temporary 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the means of firm-level and country-level variables by country and for the whole sample. The sample period is 1985-2007. The 





BLEV MLEV EPT EPR EPL SIZE TANG PROF RD RDDUM DEP MTB INDMED INFL  GGDP 
1 Australia 8,803 0.1584 0.1644 0.8800 1.3520 1.1118 10.5471 0.3411 -0.0424 0.0116 0.1732 0.0439 2.5450 0.1401 0.0309 0.0343 
2 Austria 936 0.2328 0.3207 1.3100 2.6599 1.9861 12.2819 0.3060 0.1005 0.0077 0.2553 0.0521 2.0792 0.2275 0.0211 0.0258 
3 Belgium 1,067 0.2358 0.3131 3.1666 1.8690 2.5147 12.4729 0.2636 0.1229 0.0070 0.1509 0.0541 2.1188 0.2077 0.0204 0.0249 
4 Canada 7,054 0.2064 0.2472 0.2500 0.9200 0.5853 11.8185 0.4748 0.0559 0.0171 0.1854 0.0556 2.2179 0.1714 0.0241 0.0358 
5 Denmark 1,539 0.2614 0.3344 1.5494 2.1433 1.8460 11.7478 0.3436 0.1112 0.0161 0.1969 0.0497 2.1498 0.2339 0.0224 0.0216 
6 Finland 1,328 0.2581 0.3311 1.4820 2.2922 1.8873 12.3232 0.3089 0.1351 0.0208 0.4699 0.0555 2.3913 0.2205 0.0173 0.0333 
7 France 7,840 0.2259 0.2927 3.5787 2.3861 2.9804 12.1965 0.1994 0.1057 0.0099 0.1853 0.0530 2.2740 0.2065 0.0187 0.0221 
8 Germany 3,375 0.1837 0.2397 1.9813 2.6652 2.3227 11.9116 0.2189 0.0621 0.0240 0.3022 0.0598 2.5299 0.1717 0.0184 0.0174 
9 Greece 2,721 0.2552 0.2922 4.0289 2.8002 3.4154 11.4449 0.3251 0.1085 0.0018 0.2076 0.0370 2.7947 0.2276 0.0471 0.0362 
10 Ireland 754 0.2284 0.2723 0.3130 1.4271 0.8680 11.8093 0.3484 0.0765 0.0068 0.2626 0.0348 2.1530 0.2128 0.0317 0.0601 
11 Italy 2,648 0.2537 0.3244 3.5543 2.7600 3.1573 13.1898 0.2615 0.0980 0.0062 0.2224 0.0480 1.9301 0.2288 0.0346 0.0166 
12 Japan 19,123 0.2482 0.3209 1.1779 1.6740 1.4252 12.9953 0.3007 0.0736 0.0121 0.5062 0.0295 1.9828 0.2150 0.0022 0.0149 
13 Netherlands 2,422 0.2262 0.2737 1.1925 2.9225 2.0565 12.6313 0.3127 0.1408 0.0077 0.1581 0.0559 2.6133 0.2082 0.0217 0.0296 
14 New Zealand 863 0.2287 0.2174 0.7596 1.4359 1.0756 11.1893 0.4071 0.1048 0.0067 0.1530 0.0489 2.6087 0.2337 0.0244 0.0336 
15 Norway 1,780 0.3088 0.3627 2.9984 2.3300 2.6650 11.9914 0.3698 0.0823 0.0130 0.2017 0.0539 2.3297 0.2556 0.0231 0.0284 
16 Spain 1,426 0.2268 0.2901 3.3627 2.6596 3.0098 13.1797 0.3718 0.1161 0.0024 0.0736 0.0423 2.1955 0.2257 0.0370 0.0329 
17 Sweden 2,743 0.2032 0.2924 1.8090 2.6761 2.2415 11.8495 0.2440 0.0573 0.0190 0.2920 0.0505 2.8041 0.1980 0.0210 0.0284 
18 Switzerland 2,495 0.2495 0.3598 1.1300 1.6000 1.3601 12.9053 0.3497 0.1071 0.0197 0.4020 0.0496 2.2143 0.2110 0.0155 0.0198 
19 
United 
Kingdom 16,550 0.1777 0.1962 0.2855 1.1683 0.7253 11.4503 0.3257 0.0619 0.0169 0.2859 0.0450 2.7793 0.1779 0.0293 0.0279 






4.1. Employment protection laws and leverage adjustments 
4.1.1. Baseline results 
Table 2 reports the baseline regression results for Eq. (7). Our independent variable of interest 
is the interaction between the EPL index and the distance from target (EPL*Dist). In columns 
(1)-(2), we estimate Eq. (7) using pooled OLS with bootstrapped standard errors that controls 
for country and year fixed effects. The estimates indicate that increases in the stringency of a 
country’s employment regulations are associated with decreases in firms’ leverage SOA: the 
coefficients on the interaction term between the EPL index and the distance from target 
(EPL*Dist) are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This finding implies 
that stricter employment regulations appear to increase firms’ transaction costs and costs of 
capital, thus leading to a slower speed of firms’ adjustment to target leverage ratios. This result 
support hypothesis H1a. 
One possible caution to these results is that the stringency of labour protection and firms’ 
leverage SOA may vary not only with the country and firm determinants but also with industry-
specific variables such as the nature of technology employed in the industry. To control for 
unobservable industry variables, we include industry fixed effects in addition to country and 
year fixed effects in columns (3)-(4). The industries are defined at the two-digit SIC level. 
Consistent with the previous results, we find that the coefficients on the interaction term 
between the EPL index and the distance from target (EPL*Dist) are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for both book and market leverage regressions, which indicates 




Table 2. EPL and leverage speed of adjustments – core results 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of EPL on the leverage speed of 
adjustment using following model: 
                                ∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                        
The dependent variable is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 is 
the different between the target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is EPL index 
measured by OECD. Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)  including firm size (SIZE), tangibility 
(TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), depreciation 
expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio (INDLEV), 
inflation rate (INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Results of pooled OLS regression with 
bootstrapped standard errors, year, and country fixed effects are included in Models (1) to (2); 
industry, year, and country fixed effects are included in Models (3) to (4). Results of firm fixed 
effects regression with clustered standard error at the country level with industry/year fixed 
effects are reported in Models (5)-(6).  ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. 













       
EPL*Dist -0.0220*** -0.0127*** -0.0237*** -0.0136* -0.0312** -0.0139* 
 (-4.2817) (-5.0620) (-3.0168) (-1.6766) (-2.0586) (-1.7825) 
SIZE*Dist 0.0046*** 0.0023*** 0.0048*** 0.0023** 0.0109*** 0.0021** 
 (10.1569) (3.1985) (5.0645) (2.2713) (6.0148) (2.4004) 
TANG*Dist -0.0554*** -0.0056 -0.0521*** -0.0029 -0.0682*** 0.0026 
 (-5.7348) (-0.3119) (-4.5868) (-0.2117) (-2.7024) (0.1505) 
PROF*Dist -0.0017 -0.0137 -0.0009 -0.0138 0.0283 -0.0142 
 (-0.0711) (-0.7533) (-0.0791) (-0.8607) (0.4906) (-0.6435) 
RD*Dist 0.0363 -0.2521*** 0.0446 -0.2586** 0.0766 -0.2546*** 
 (0.4082) (-4.2311) (0.4213) (-2.2547) (0.6006) (-2.9343) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.0073*** 0.0153 -0.0101*** 0.0144*** -0.0131** 0.0151* 
 (-2.6063) (1.6103) (-3.9802) (2.8275) (-2.5671) (1.7051) 
DEP*Dist 0.4349*** 0.2308*** 0.4257*** 0.2227* 0.4869*** 0.2016 
 (7.0134) (2.7462) (2.7416) (1.7688) (3.2411) (1.4008) 
MTB*Dist 0.0000 -0.0015*** 0.0001 -0.0016*** -0.0007 -0.0014* 
 (0.0097) (-2.8080) (0.1176) (-7.7491) (-0.5205) (-1.8275) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.0870*** -0.0028 -0.0868** -0.0049 -0.1022* -0.0192 
 (-7.3401) (-0.2149) (-2.4128) (-0.1824) (-1.8380) (-0.6837) 
INFL*Dist 1.8728*** 1.0361*** 1.9168*** 1.0672*** 2.1672*** 1.1360*** 
 (12.3150) (6.8856) (14.3162) (5.6012) (4.8021) (6.6198) 
GGDP*Dist 3.0623*** 2.6539*** 3.1031*** 2.7056*** 3.4405*** 2.6816*** 
 (33.1058) (14.6024) (24.6727) (10.3792) (9.4220) (13.3193) 
Constant -0.0034 -0.0261*** -0.0004 -0.0258** 0.0238 0.0034 
 (-0.9494) (-5.3608) (-0.1084) (-2.2014) (0.4830) (0.0695) 
       
Observations 74,700 74,700 74,468 74,468 74,468 74,468 
R-squared 0.0868 0.0749 0.0893 0.0767 0.0874 0.0792 
Firm FE NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES   
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Next, given that leverage adjustments are firm-level choices, we employ firm fixed effects 
estimators to control for time-invariant unobserved firm-specific factors that may be correlated 
with the leverage SOA. We cluster the standard errors at the country level as the labour 
regulations vary at the country level. Consistently, the coefficients on the interaction term 
between the EPL index and the distance from target (EPL*Dist) as reported in columns (5)-(6) 
are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, representing a negative 
association between the stringency of a country’s labour regulations and firms’ leverage SOA.  
Regarding the economic effects, a one-standard-deviation increase in EPL index decreases 
leverage adjustments by 1.2 - 2.8 percent, compared with an average adjustment speed of 20.5 
percent15. In other words, an average firm takes about 3 years to adjust half of the deviation 
between the actual and target leverage. This duration increases to about 3.6 years with stringent 
labour protection16. In general, the results lend strong support to our hypothesis H1a that the 
stringency of labour regulation causes delays in firms’ desired leverage adjustment.  
4.1.2. Robustness of results 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our baseline results by using alternative 
measures of the stringency of labour regulation, alternative measures of leverage, and 
alternative subsamples of countries and firms. 
4.1.2.1. Alternative measures of EPLs  
Following previous studies, we consider alternative measures of EPLs to check the robustness 
of our results (Karpuz et al., 2020; Levine et al., 2020; Simintzi et al., 2015). Table 3 reports 
 
15 To compute the economic significance of the association between the stringency of labour regulations and 
leverage SOA, we take the product of the coefficients and sample standard deviation of the EPL index (An et al., 
2015; Çolak et al., 2018; Faulkender et al., 2012). 
16 The half-life time is calculated as Ln(0.5)/Ln(1-0.204), where 0.205 is the sample mean of adjustment speeds. 
Because the stringency of labour regulations decreases the adjustment speeds by 1.2 to 2.8 percent, the half-life 




the results. First, in columns (1)-(2), we use the EPL index developed by Allard (2005) (EPLA) 
that extends the OECD indicator of employment protection by also considering the smaller 
changes in the law. The coefficients on the interaction term between EPLA index and the 
distance from target are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating 
that stricter labour regulation is negatively associated with firms’ leverage SOA. Next, we 
replicate our baseline regression using three proxies of labour regulations’ stringency suggested 
by Botero et al. (2004): collective relations law index (CRLI), social security laws index (SSLI), 
and employment laws index (ELI). Results, which are reported in columns (3)-(8), consistently 
indicate the negative impact of all three aspects of labour laws’ strictness on leverage 
adjustment. Finally, columns (9)-(10) estimate the same specification using unemployment 
coverage (UNEC) constructed by Aleksynska and Schindler (2011) as a proxy for EPLs. Again, 
the results show that an increase in generosity of unemployment benefits reduces the speed that 




Table 3. EPL and leverage speed of adjustments – Alternative measures of EPL 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of alternative measures of EPL on the leverage speed of adjustment using following model: 
                                ∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                        
The dependent variable is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 is the different between the target leverage ratio and 
the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is EPL index measured by Allard (2005) (EPLA), collective relations law index (CRLI), social security law index 
(SSLI), employment laws index (ELI), and unemployment coverage (UNCE). Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)  including firm size (SIZE), tangibility 
(TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), depreciation expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry 
median leverage ratio (INDLEV), inflation rate (INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Year and country fixed effects are included in all models. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are 

























           
EPL*Dist -0.0166*** -0.0231*** -0.0548*** -0.0264*** -0.0751*** -0.0326** -0.0148*** -0.0071** -0.0031 -0.0260*** 
 (-2.8772) (-3.1612) (-7.5977) (-4.4436) (-3.2110) (-2.3124) (-2.8562) (-2.2195) (-0.6069) (-5.0545) 
SIZE*Dist 0.0024*** -0.0001 0.0022*** 0.0010 0.0015 0.0008 0.0023*** 0.0011 0.0027*** -0.0010 
 (2.8214) (-0.1798) (3.2846) (0.9119) (1.3732) (0.8586) (2.9162) (1.6423) (2.9577) (-1.3969) 
TANG*Dist -0.0376*** 0.0175 -0.0610*** -0.0073 -0.0446** -0.0001 -0.0502*** -0.0026 -0.0496** 0.0029 
 (-3.1057) (1.0525) (-3.8757) (-0.8699) (-2.1519) (-0.0079) (-2.9465) (-0.1532) (-2.3352) (0.1813) 
PROF*Dist 0.0169 -0.0373** 0.0052 -0.0107 0.0016 -0.0130 0.0031 -0.0122 0.0275 -0.0150 
 (0.4456) (-2.0923) (0.1897) (-0.7887) (0.0514) (-1.0062) (0.0813) (-0.9339) (0.8848) (-0.7661) 
RD*Dist 0.1320 -0.0923 -0.0333 -0.2808*** 0.0497 -0.2473*** 0.0537 -0.2464*** -0.0145 -0.1912** 
 (1.2271) (-0.7763) (-0.3030) (-3.0136) (1.0634) (-6.4771) (0.4633) (-4.5365) (-0.1019) (-2.0245) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.0171** -0.0049 -0.0027 0.0175*** -0.0070 0.0158*** -0.0085 0.0151** -0.0123*** 0.0055 
 (-2.1980) (-0.5164) (-0.4753) (3.6221) (-1.2140) (4.2801) (-1.1341) (2.1418) (-3.3263) (0.8829) 
DEP*Dist 0.4931*** 0.2125* 0.3745*** 0.1924*** 0.4100*** 0.2211*** 0.4319*** 0.2330* 0.4869*** 0.2975*** 
 (4.7330) (1.6820) (4.3214) (2.9711) (3.6763) (2.7509) (3.8831) (1.7363) (3.7640) (3.1991) 
MTB*Dist -0.0003 -0.0016*** 0.0000 -0.0015*** -0.0002 -0.0016** -0.0002 -0.0017*** 0.0003 -0.0014** 
 (-0.3197) (-3.0316) (0.0263) (-2.5998) (-0.1900) (-2.5155) (-0.1627) (-8.6769) (0.3176) (-2.0436) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.0188 0.0373* -0.0888*** -0.0035 -0.0971*** -0.0072 -0.0950*** -0.0062 -0.0714*** -0.0000 
 (-0.5579) (1.7325) (-3.6890) (-0.1325) (-5.6664) (-0.4099) (-4.9617) (-0.3379) (-3.9995) (-0.0007) 
INFL*Dist 1.7242*** 1.2970*** 1.2828*** 0.7420*** 1.9569*** 1.0587*** 2.0038*** 1.0885*** 1.7385*** 0.9306*** 
 (9.6275) (5.8617) (8.0007) (7.2688) (9.8103) (5.8617) (11.9443) (6.5607) (19.4289) (5.4962) 
GGDP*Dist 3.0618*** 2.4742*** 2.6098*** 2.4551*** 3.2047*** 2.7115*** 3.1836*** 2.7083*** 3.2798*** 2.9689*** 
 (15.0624) (10.0656) (17.3419) (17.2156) (16.9928) (12.4911) (24.6651) (18.6756) (32.8728) (17.2781) 
Constant -0.0029 -0.0335*** -0.0030 -0.0259*** -0.0031 -0.0260*** -0.0032 -0.0260*** -0.0020 -0.0281*** 
 (-0.8000) (-10.5233) (-1.1006) (-6.0510) (-1.1033) (-5.1034) (-1.0252) (-4.8944) (-0.8695) (-7.6303) 
           
Observations 51,527 51,527 74,702 74,702 74,702 74,702 74,702 74,702 59,879 59,879 
R-squared 0.0789 0.0587 0.0884 0.0751 0.0866 0.0748 0.0866 0.0748 0.0859 0.0763 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




4.1.2.2. Alternative measures of leverage 
We further use an alternative measure of leverage ratio to test the robustness of the baseline 
finding. Faulkender et al. (2012) indicate that the change in leverage ratio includes both passive 
and active adjustments, with the former being a mechanical adjustment and the latter involving 
firms actually visiting the capital markets. Since transaction costs only associate with active 
adjustments, Faulkender et al. (2012) suggest that studies on dynamic capital structure should 
only focus on the active component. Consequently, we measure leverage ratio concentrating on 




𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 
 
where 𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 is the net income during the year ending at time t+1. Leverage at t+1 would be 
𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑝
 if the firm engages in no net capital market activities. 
Our Eq. (2) then becomes the following partial active adjustment model: 
𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1  −  𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑝 = ∧𝑗 (𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1
∗  − 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑝 ) +  𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                                               (8) 
The left-hand side of Eq. (8) equals the firm’s active leverage adjustment.  
Table 4 reports the results of this robustness check. We find that the coefficients of the 
interaction between EPL index and the distance from target are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels for all specifications (columns (1)-(6)), 





Table 4. EPL and leverage speed of adjustments – Alternative measures of leverage 
This table reports the robustness checks using partial active leverage adjustment as alternative 
measure of leverage for following regressions: 
 ∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1  
The dependent variable is the change in leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  is the different 
between the target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is EPL index measured 
by OECD. Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)  including firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TANG), 
profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), depreciation expenses 
(DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio (INDLEV), inflation rate 
(INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Results of pooled OLS regression with bootstrapped 
standard errors, year, and country fixed effects are included in Models (1) to (2); industry, year, 
and country fixed effects are included in Models (3) to (4). Results of firm fixed effects 
regression with clustered standard error at the country level with industry/year fixed effects are 
reported in Models (5)-(6). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are bootstrapped. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The 
variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
 Pooled OLS with bootstrapped SE Firm Fixed Effects 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
EPL*Dist -0.0234*** -0.0257** -0.0303*** 
 (-3.4570) (-2.5287) (-4.7181) 
SIZE*Dist -0.0070*** -0.0069*** -0.0080*** 
 (-10.0684) (-9.4276) (-10.4058) 
TANG*Dist -0.0156*** -0.0134*** -0.0112* 
 (-4.6727) (-6.9210) (-1.7540) 
PROF*Dist -0.0724*** -0.0715*** -0.0576*** 
 (-6.2189) (-11.5085) (-8.1973) 
RD*Dist 0.0278 0.0375 0.0855** 
 (0.4758) (0.5778) (2.0564) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.0058*** -0.0075*** -0.0119*** 
 (-2.6924) (-6.1433) (-4.0336) 
DEP*Dist 0.3207*** 0.3159*** 0.4037*** 
 (5.7839) (7.9133) (11.9962) 
MTB*Dist -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006** 
 (-0.9054) (-0.8762) (-2.2198) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.0305*** -0.0301*** -0.0307*** 
 (-3.0221) (-2.5992) (-2.7499) 
INFL*Dist 1.7514*** 1.7887*** 2.1691*** 
 (16.8046) (12.2525) (26.3241) 
GGDP*Dist 1.2630*** 1.2882*** 1.5596*** 
 (9.4505) (10.8055) (19.3433) 
Constant -0.0031 -0.0008 0.0287 
 (-0.7805) (-0.1998) (0.5022) 
    
Observations 64,233 64,084 64,084 
R-squared 0.0881 0.0904 0.0899 
Firm FE NO NO YES 
Industry FE NO YES  
Year FE YES YES YES 





4.1.2.3. Alternative subsamples 
Our sample covers firms from 19 countries. Due to the heterogeneity of the sample, the negative 
association between EPLs and leverage SOA may not remain valid across all countries. Thus, 
we first examine the robustness of our results in different subsamples of countries. As United 
Kingdom and Japan are the majority of the sample, we examine whether the baseline findings 
are driven by labour laws and firms’ behaviour in these countries. Panel A of Table 5 shows 
that the significantly negative relationship between EPLs and leverage SOA remains unchanged 
in both subsamples: United Kingdom and Japan firms only, or when all observations from these 
two countries are removed. 
Further, we test our baseline results separately for multinational and non-multinational firms. 
Since multinational firms relate to significant foreign operations and foreign labour forces, 
these firms are less likely affected by changes in their home country’s labour laws. This, thus, 
introduces a noise into our baseline regression. Following previous studies (Gungoraydinoglu, 
Çolak, & Öztekin, 2017; Karpuz et al., 2020), we consider firms as multinational if they report 
foreign operating income or foreign income tax in the past five consecutive years. The results 
are presented in Panel B of Table 5. We find that multinational firms’ leverage SOA is only 
weakly affected by changes in the stringency of their home country’s employee regulations. In 




Table 5. EPL and leverage speed of adjustments – Alternative subsamples 
This table reports the robustness checks using different subsamples including U.K and Japan 
only and non-U.K and non-Japan in Panel A, and multinational firms and non-multinational 
firms in Panel B for following regression: 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1  
The dependent variable is the change in leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  is the different 
between the target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is EPL index measured 
by OECD. Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)  including firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TANG), 
profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), depreciation expenses 
(DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio (INDLEV), inflation rate 
(INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Year and country fixed effects are included in all 
models. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 




 Panel A  Panel B 

















          
EPL*Dist -0.1268*** -0.0725*** -0.0211*** -0.0169***  -0.0390** -0.0089 -0.0200*** -0.0146*** 
 (-9.7618) (-12.6597) (-3.1667) (-3.1356)  (-2.0218) (-1.1675) (-3.5647) (-7.9773) 
SIZE*Dist 0.0059*** 0.0028** 0.0076*** 0.0041***  0.0043*** 0.0019 0.0050*** 0.0024** 
 (3.7806) (2.2595) (6.2298) (4.9340)  (6.2492) (1.5358) (3.2804) (2.0487) 
TANG*Dist -0.0933*** -0.0125 -0.0277** -0.0022  -0.0406** -0.0003 -0.0608*** -0.0028 
 (-11.1283) (-0.4122) (-2.0520) (-0.1310)  (-2.0998) (-0.0113) (-4.5779) (-0.1783) 
PROF*Dist 0.0159 -0.0280*** -0.0253* -0.0084  -0.0236 -0.0399 0.0167 0.0085 
 (0.3151) (-3.1709) (-1.7411) (-0.4640)  (-0.3921) (-1.1125) (0.3319) (0.3124) 
RD*Dist -0.1231 -0.4067*** 0.1069 -0.1007  -0.0137 -0.1603*** 0.0897 -0.2941*** 
 (-0.7740) (-4.6137) (0.8136) (-1.3958)  (-0.0760) (-5.2019) (0.5098) (-3.7983) 
RDDUM*Dist 0.0096* 0.0343*** -0.0126 -0.0052  0.0020 0.0115* -0.0115* 0.0192*** 
 (1.8358) (2.7215) (-1.3481) (-0.7332)  (0.6263) (1.7892) (-1.6516) (3.6528) 
DEP*Dist 0.2703*** 0.1924 0.3973*** 0.1455***  0.1563 0.1312 0.5516*** 0.2616* 
 (6.6946) (1.0597) (3.8573) (3.7836)  (0.7703) (0.9712) (3.3809) (1.7855) 
MTB*Dist 0.0019 -0.0011** -0.0011 -0.0016  0.0022 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0025*** 
 (1.0851) (-1.9945) (-1.1204) (-1.1787)  (1.2249) (0.1415) (-0.9550) (-13.8049) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.0314 -0.0183 -0.1181** 0.0015  -0.1435*** -0.0562* -0.0555 0.0275* 
 (-0.9297) (-1.0799) (-2.2071) (0.0650)  (-10.2821) (-1.9260) (-1.2127) (1.7634) 
INFL*Dist 0.6401*** 0.1079 1.4720*** 1.0208***  2.1922*** 1.0328*** 1.6446*** 1.0096*** 
 (4.1865) (0.4061) (5.8400) (3.2938)  (6.5137) (7.0640) (17.8684) (9.8736) 
GGDP*Dist 2.6874*** 2.6886*** 2.6105*** 2.4017***  3.1961*** 3.0957*** 2.9445*** 2.4324*** 
 (12.5502) (25.4192) (10.7928) (7.7211)  (24.7404) (9.5168) (14.2940) (11.7917) 
Constant -0.0053** -0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0499***  0.0063 -0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0294*** 
 (-2.3801) (-0.7391) (-0.6478) (-15.6818)  (0.8874) (-0.1225) (-0.7905) (-5.0100) 
          
Observations 31,536 31,536 43,164 43,164  29,415 29,415 45,285 45,285 
R-squared 0.0852 0.1049 0.0928 0.0763  0.0883 0.0782 0.0889 0.0796 
Year FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 




4.2. Endogeneity issues 
Even though we include an intensive set of control variables in addition to industry, country, 
and year fixed effects in our baseline regressions in Table 2, there still may be concerns about 
endogeneity. Specifically, the impacts of a country’s EPLs on firms’ leverage SOA may occur 
because of other reforms that applied at the same time as the changes in labour laws. 
Consequently, the change in leverage SOA may not be determined by the change in EPLs but 
by unobserved variables. This endogeneity of labour regulations can lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates. We address this issue using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, the 
methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and controlling for additional variables. 
4.2.1. IV approach 
In this session, we address the concern that the effect of EPLs on leverage adjustments may be 
endogenous by using IV method. Specifically, Botero et al. (2004) find that legal origin is the 
most important determinant of a country’s labour regulation that is exogenous to firms’ 
financial decisions. Botero et al. (2004) argue that civil countries regulate labour markets more 
extensively than common law countries, whereas common law countries have a less generous 





Table 6. Instrumental variable 
This table reports the first-stage and second-stage regression from our IV regressions. In the 
first stage, we regress the EPL index interacted with Dist on the instruments and the controls, 
where a given EPL index are instrumented using country’s legal origin. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is proxied by 
EPL index measured by OECD. Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) including firm size (SIZE), 
tangibility (TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), 
depreciation expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio 
(INDLEV), inflation rate (INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). In the second stage, we regress 
dependent variable that is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑗) on the 
predicted values of EPL*Dist and the control variables. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 is the different between the 
target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. Year and country fixed effects are in all 
models. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are bootstrapped and reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
  









     
EPL*Dist  -0.0635***  -0.0284*** 
  (0.0047)  (0.0060) 
Common*Dist -0.9922***  -0.9831***  
 (0.0025)  (0.0025)  
StockCap*Dist     
     
SIZE*Dist 0.0334*** 0.0062*** 0.0306*** 0.0028*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
TANG*Dist -0.1841*** -0.0753*** -0.1464*** -0.0124 
 (0.0045) (0.0085) (0.0044) (0.0108) 
PROF*Dist -0.1238*** 0.0036 -0.1136*** -0.0122 
 (0.0057) (0.0105) (0.0056) (0.0133) 
RD*Dist 0.4722*** 0.0254 0.2573*** -0.2554*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0633) (0.0339) (0.0814) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.1131*** -0.0105** -0.0934*** 0.0143** 
 (0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0027) (0.0065) 
DEP*Dist 1.0308*** 0.4703*** 1.2178*** 0.2436*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0448) (0.0250) (0.0602) 
MTB*Dist -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0019*** -0.0015*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
INDLEV*Dist 0.1302*** -0.0701*** 0.0854*** 0.0025 
 (0.0089) (0.0165) (0.0063) (0.0152) 
INFL*Dist 9.8040*** 1.9087*** 9.5899*** 1.0531*** 
 (0.0617) (0.1060) (0.0594) (0.1331) 
GGDP*Dist 3.8158*** 2.8662*** 4.1273*** 2.6040*** 
 (0.0654) (0.1160) (0.0633) (0.1467) 
Constant 0.0045*** 0.0060*** -0.0057*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0019) 
     
Observations 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 
R-squared 0.7896 0.0854 0.8015 0.0748 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
IV F-stat  155402  157580 




We use a dummy variable, which is equal to one for firms from common law countries, and 
zero otherwise (COMMON). Table 6 presents the results of the IV regressions. Columns (1) 
and (3) report the results of first-stage regressions that use EPL*Dist as the dependent variable. 
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficients on the interaction between common law dummy 
variable and the distance to target (COMMON*Dist) are negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level, indicating that countries with common law legal origin have less labour 
protection than civil law countries. In the second stage regressions (columns (2) and (4)), using 
the fitted values of EPL*Dist from the first stage as explanatory variables to estimate our 
baseline regression, we continue to find a negative and significant association between EPLs 
and leverage SOA.  
We also check the validity of the instruments by reporting first-stage F-statistics of the test of 
the null hypothesis that the instrument can be excluded from the first-stage regressions. The F-
statistics is above 50, that recommends a strong rejection of the null hypothesis. The p-value of 
Durbin tests is 0.000, indicating that EPLs is endogenous. In sum, these results reinforce the 
confidence of our analysis, confirming the previously documented negative association 
between the stringency of labour regulations and leverage SOA.17 
4.2.2. Cross-sectional heterogeneity 
We next exploit the causal relation between the stringency of labour regulations and leverage 
SOA by examining the different effects of labour regulation rigidity across industries with 
different labour adjustment characteristics. The expectation is that if EPLs indeed have a 
negative impact on leverage SOA, then increases in employment protection should have a 
 
17 In an unreported table, following Alimov (2015), we use a highly correlated variable with legal origin, that is 
the development of a country’s stock market as an alternative instrument. The results are consistent with our 
expectation. Specifically, we find that countries with great stock market development tend to have less labour 





relatively stronger effect on leverage SOA of firms in industries that require a naturally higher 
propensity to adjust their labour force (higher labour turnover for their operations). 
To conduct the test, we construct a proxy for the industry’s labour turnover rates using the US 
Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce Indicator (QWI) data18. Alimov (2015) suggests that 
using US industry data to construct this measure is appropriate as most industries in the US and 
OECD countries share commonality in structure and technologies. Following Abowd and 





where HirA is hires, Sep is separation, Emp is beginning-of-period employment, and EmpEnd 
is end-of-period employment.  
Although previous studies (Alimov, 2015; Simintzi et al., 2015) exploit labour turnover 
measures from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), using the QWI data has some advantages. 
Specifically, as the QWI data fully covers short duration jobs, it provides a more comprehensive 
coverage of labour turnover (Davis & Haltiwanger, 2014). Furthermore, while Davis et al. 
(1996) capture only 20 manufacturing industries based on two-digit SIC, the QWI data captures 
the labour turnover of over 200 industries based on four-digit SIC.19 
 
18  Because the QWI data use North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) as the industry 
classification, we measure the industry mean rates for each four-digit NAICS and match them to their three-digit 
SIC equivalents. 





Table 7. Industry labour turnover effects 
This table reports the regression results for the following model: 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  + µ𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
+  𝜌𝑖,𝑡,𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 
The dependent variable is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is 
the different between the target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is EPL index 
measured by OECD. Labour Turnover rates (LabourTurnOver) are calculated using the 
Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) data from U.S. Census Bureau. Control variables 
(vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 )  including firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D 
expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), depreciation expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio 
(MTB), industry median leverage ratio (INDLEV), inflation rate (INFL), and GDP growth rate 
(GGDP). Year and country fixed effects are included in all models. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are bootstrapped. T-








   
EPL*Dist -0.0174*** 0.0068 
 (-2.9237) (0.8344) 
EPL*LabourTurnover*Dist -0.0210** -0.0415*** 
 (-2.0056) (-4.1771) 
LabourTurnover*Dist 0.0158 0.0146** 
 (1.6003) (2.5127) 
SIZE*Dist 0.0044*** 0.0018** 
 (8.1843) (2.4985) 
TANG*Dist -0.0514*** -0.0014 
 (-4.6424) (-0.1029) 
PROF*Dist 0.0100 -0.0141 
 (0.3687) (-0.8602) 
RD*Dist 0.0244 -0.2720*** 
 (0.1706) (-3.7997) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.0082 0.0149** 
 (-1.0636) (2.2934) 
DEP*Dist 0.4547*** 0.2435** 
 (5.6919) (2.5058) 
MTB*Dist 0.0002 -0.0013*** 
 (0.2289) (-2.9818) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.1207*** -0.0249* 
 (-4.2646) (-1.8285) 
INFL*Dist 1.9591*** 0.9058*** 
 (23.7883) (3.8392) 
GGDP*Dist 3.0798*** 2.8369*** 
 (27.7377) (14.0487) 
Constant 0.0141*** -0.0083* 
 (4.9343) (-1.7463) 
   
Observations 69,248 69,248 
R-squared 0.0851 0.0757 
Year FE YES YES 




Table 7 reports the results that include the triple interaction term among EPL index, labour 
turnover, and the distance from target (EPL*LabourTurnover*Dist). The results show that the 
estimated coefficients on the triple interaction term (EPL*LabourTurnover*Dist) are negative 
and statistically significant in columns (1)-(2). This indicates that the association between the 
stringency of labour regulation and leverage SOA is significantly stronger in industries which 
more frequently adjust their labour force. We note that the coefficients on the interaction term 
between EPL index and the distance from target (EPL*Dist) are still negative and statistically 
significant for book leverage but lose their significance for market leverage. These results imply 
that, in response to an increase in the strictness of a country’s labour laws, only firms in 
industries that have higher rate of labour turnover tend to have higher costs of accessing external 
financing sources and thus delay their adjustment to target leverage.  
4.2.3. Omitted variables 
To further alleviate the potential endogeneity concern, in this section, we consider several 
possible omitted variables that may be correlated with employment regulations and leverage 
SOA. Specifically, we control for additional variables to capture potential confounding impacts 




Table 8. EPL and leverage speed of adjustments – Omitted variables 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of EPL on the leverage speed of adjustment, 
controlling for potential omitted variables for following regression: 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1  
The dependent variable is the change in leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the different between the 
target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡  is EPL index measured by OECD. Column (1)-
(2) controls for government spending on labour, column (3)-(4) controls for the overall unionization rate, 
and column (5)-(6) controls for political orientation of the country’s ruling party. Column (7)-(8) 
controls for all three political variables. Other control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)  including firm size (SIZE), 
tangibility (TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), depreciation 
expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio (INDLEV), inflation rate 
(INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Year and country fixed effects are in all models. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are bootstrapped. T-


















         
EPL*Dist -0.0235*** -0.0162*** -0.0234*** -0.0168*** -0.0255** -0.0195* -0.1175*** -0.0576*** 
 (-3.1219) (-3.6942) (-3.0638) (-3.8197) (-2.2342) (-1.7359) (-5.0308) (-2.8119) 
SIZE*Dist 0.0042*** 0.0022** -0.0012*** -0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0136*** -0.0056*** 
 (8.6793) (2.0067) (-3.8038) (-0.5800) (-1.1289) (-0.9086) (-14.4123) (-5.3499) 
TANG*Dist -0.0513*** -0.0062 -0.0542*** -0.0080 -0.0566*** -0.0115 -0.0429* -0.0048 
 (-3.2154) (-0.4997) (-3.2490) (-0.6481) (-3.1093) (-0.9042) (-1.7769) (-0.2670) 
PROF*Dist 0.0070 -0.0121 0.0263 -0.0028 0.0279 -0.0034 0.0675*** 0.0243 
 (0.4433) (-0.7063) (1.6168) (-0.1598) (1.1150) (-0.2919) (3.3104) (0.5496) 
RD*Dist 0.0308 -0.2805*** 0.0475 -0.2782*** 0.0317 -0.3187*** -0.0562 -0.5232*** 
 (0.2530) (-4.1024) (0.4000) (-3.8787) (0.2601) (-5.1855) (-0.9504) (-4.0706) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.0063 0.0165** -0.0092 0.0154** -0.0076* 0.0181*** 0.0068 0.0286*** 
 (-1.0587) (2.1240) (-1.6235) (2.0274) (-1.8106) (4.1195) (1.5575) (2.8600) 
DEP*Dist 0.3755*** 0.2160** 0.3600*** 0.2168*** 0.3459*** 0.1930** -0.0470 -0.0698 
 (5.5682) (2.5527) (5.4456) (2.5809) (3.5190) (2.3013) (-0.5864) (-0.6162) 
MTB*Dist 0.0000 -0.0014* -0.0004 -0.0017* -0.0003 -0.0015** -0.0000 -0.0023** 
 (0.0073) (-1.7231) (-0.5132) (-1.9234) (-0.1920) (-2.1571) (-0.0771) (-2.5090) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.0822*** 0.0029 -0.0849*** 0.0023 -0.0904*** -0.0080 -0.1603*** -0.0647** 
 (-3.5785) (0.2046) (-3.6688) (0.1688) (-4.1441) (-0.5118) (-3.9597) (-1.9992) 
INFL*Dist 1.9029*** 1.0347*** 2.2135*** 1.2077*** 2.1004*** 0.8914*** 0.8746*** 0.3409 
 (7.8073) (7.8724) (8.9461) (6.9437) (22.9681) (4.1168) (2.9330) (1.1040) 
GGDP*Dist 3.0063*** 2.6061*** 3.0722*** 2.6485*** 3.0385*** 2.6789*** 2.2715*** 1.9468*** 
 (12.9985) (20.1484) (13.5023) (20.1122) (23.5860) (24.0712) (4.7446) (4.3531) 
CREDITOR*Dist 0.0020 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0039 -0.0042 0.0046 -0.0039 
 (0.8557) (0.0072) (-0.7785) (-0.6128) (-1.3931) (-1.3180) (1.4437) (-0.8390) 
TAX*Dist   0.0031*** 0.0019*** 0.0031*** 0.0017*** 0.0086*** 0.0052*** 
   (14.7031) (3.4753) (8.5113) (3.6364) (5.8410) (10.3424) 
UNION*Dist     0.0005*** 0.0007** -0.0006 -0.0001 
     (3.3249) (2.1850) (-1.4909) (-0.2495) 
BARGAIN*Dist       0.0026*** 0.0015*** 
       (5.7292) (7.3014) 
Constant -0.0034 -0.0222*** -0.0034 -0.0220*** -0.0036** -0.0218*** 0.0093 -0.0104 
 (-1.1500) (-9.5100) (-1.1224) (-9.5704) (-2.1154) (-4.2548) (0.7595) (-0.9830) 
         
Observations 70,147 70,147 70,147 70,147 68,655 68,655 36,774 36,774 
R-squared 0.0853 0.0737 0.0862 0.0739 0.0860 0.0745 0.1011 0.0794 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




As suggested by Öztekin and Flannery (2012), when a country’s institutional characteristics 
encourage debt and equity issuances, firms operating in such countries adjust more quickly 
toward the targets. We include credit rights index (CREDITOR) and tax shields (TAX) as 
additional control variables. The results presented in columns (1)-(4) of Table 8 show that while 
leverage SOA increases with the tax shield, creditor rights have no effect. More importantly, 
the coefficients on the interaction term between EPL index and the distance from target are still 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, implying that the negative association 
between EPLs and leverage SOA still remains. 
Next, we consider whether EPL index is proxying for other employment indicators. We add 
union density (UNION) and centralized bargaining (BARGAIN) as proxies for the stringency 
of the labour regulations. Columns (5)-(8) show that leverage SOA increases in countries with 
more centralized bargaining while the impact of union density on leverage SOA is ambiguous. 
The impacts of creditor rights and tax shield remain, as in columns (1)-(4). Importantly, the 
coefficients of the interaction term between EPLs and leverage SOA are not affected by the 
addition of these control variables, which are still negative and statistically significant.  
4.3. Impacts of a country’s institutions 
Our next analysis considers the impact of the effectiveness of a country’s legal enforcement on 
the association between legal regulation and leverage SOA. Rutkowski and Scarpetta (2005) 
show that labour laws have weak compliance and are not fully enforced in countries with weak 
legal systems. We expect that a country’s weak legal enforcement can mitigate the negative 




Table 9. Employment protection and SOA: A Country’s enforcement effects 
This table reports the regression results for the effect country’s institution on CSP – leverage SOA relationship using the following model: 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +∧𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + ∆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑗,𝑡  +  𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 
The dependent variable is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the different between the target leverage ratio and 
the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is proxied by EPL index measured by OECD. 𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑗,𝑡 is the country’s enforcement variables, which include 
efficiency of judicial system (EFFJUD), rule of law (RULLAW), level of corruption (CORRUP), risk of expropriation (RISEXP), and repudiation 
of contracts by government (RISCON). Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) including firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D 
expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), depreciation expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio (INDLEV), 
inflation rate (INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Year and country fixed effects are included in all models. ***, **, * indicate significance at 



























           
EPL*Dist -0.0104* -0.0026 -0.0211*** -0.0125*** -0.0048 -0.0031 -0.0172*** -0.0102** -0.0164** -0.0095 
 (-1.6468) (-0.4233) (-3.1335) (-3.1066) (-0.9573) (-0.7377) (-2.8476) (-2.4080) (-2.4990) (-1.2196) 
EPL*ENFORC*Dist -0.0464*** -0.0154*** -0.0444*** -0.0241** -0.0318*** -0.0079 -0.0571*** -0.0312*** -0.0318*** -0.0185 
 (-4.1425) (-2.6725) (-5.7280) (-2.3403) (-3.6119) (-0.6788) (-4.5378) (-2.5800) (-2.7822) (-1.2141) 
ENFORC*Dist  0.0256*** 0.0134*** 0.0294*** 0.0163*** 0.0301*** 0.0154*** 0.0289*** 0.0151*** 0.0254*** 0.0134*** 
 (17.6225) (9.5460) (24.3204) (5.8537) (18.0747) (9.7716) (24.6246) (6.2757) (26.7780) (7.8746) 
SIZE*Dist -0.0139*** -0.0076*** -0.0144*** -0.0083*** -0.0143*** -0.0075*** -0.0156*** -0.0083*** -0.0133*** -0.0072*** 
 (-16.6529) (-9.5076) (-11.7443) (-4.2650) (-9.6268) (-10.9040) (-12.7275) (-4.4482) (-12.4426) (-4.4061) 
TANG*Dist -0.0517*** -0.0029 -0.0578*** -0.0057 -0.0535*** -0.0033 -0.0515*** -0.0034 -0.0492*** -0.0019 
 (-10.3188) (-0.2786) (-6.5774) (-0.4368) (-6.3714) (-0.3888) (-6.1306) (-0.2687) (-5.7093) (-0.1809) 
PROF*Dist 0.0498 0.0097* 0.0528** 0.0137 0.0412* 0.0061 0.0487* 0.0094 0.0419 0.0063 
 (1.0076) (1.7986) (1.9842) (0.8609) (1.7870) (0.3870) (1.8318) (0.6317) (1.6035) (0.3450) 
RD*Dist -0.0520 -0.3046*** -0.0985 -0.3322*** -0.1454 -0.3465*** -0.0876 -0.3177*** -0.0658 -0.3056*** 
 (-0.3175) (-8.5127) (-1.1909) (-3.5042) (-1.4420) (-4.1727) (-0.9718) (-3.4099) (-0.7290) (-4.1659) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.0041 0.0180*** 0.0028 0.0218*** 0.0041 0.0218*** -0.0008 0.0194*** -0.0028 0.0183** 
 (-0.6426) (3.3383) (0.7807) (4.0170) (0.6179) (3.5487) (-0.2358) (3.6163) (-0.8549) (2.4436) 
DEP*Dist 0.2321** 0.1312* 0.1597** 0.0810 0.1425** 0.0776 0.1863*** 0.1088 0.2251*** 0.1298 
 (2.3982) (1.7279) (2.2796) (0.6708) (2.1166) (1.2636) (2.7006) (0.8804) (3.1828) (1.5007) 
MTB*Dist -0.0009 -0.0021*** -0.0008 -0.0020*** -0.0007 -0.0020*** -0.0008 -0.0020*** -0.0008 -0.0020*** 
 (-1.1188) (-4.9675) (-0.8997) (-4.9687) (-0.8932) (-4.9244) (-0.9148) (-5.1545) (-0.8604) (-4.3286) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.1140*** -0.0109 -0.1037*** -0.0093 -0.1189*** -0.0127 -0.1151*** -0.0112 -0.1142*** -0.0105 
 (-7.7852) (-0.5888) (-6.9834) (-0.7113) (-6.2984) (-0.7164) (-7.7881) (-0.8840) (-8.0775) (-0.5120) 
INFL*Dist 1.5517*** 0.8956*** 1.4869*** 0.8059*** 1.3676*** 0.7951*** 1.4984*** 0.7950*** 1.7257*** 0.9136*** 
 (6.1539) (6.4066) (8.8619) (6.1668) (7.8450) (5.5863) (7.9837) (6.3501) (9.5546) (6.7211) 
GGDP*Dist 2.5858*** 2.4248*** 2.2852*** 2.2472*** 2.2887*** 2.2809*** 2.5179*** 2.3727*** 2.7340*** 2.4787*** 
 (19.7077) (56.7195) (31.0691) (13.4303) (19.3273) (10.5826) (36.9614) (14.9663) (38.0668) (25.7235) 
Constant -0.0027 -0.0253*** -0.0015 -0.0246*** -0.0012 -0.0250*** -0.0019 -0.0250*** -0.0025 -0.0253*** 
 (-0.6809) (-9.6598) (-0.4240) (-5.4355) (-0.4389) (-12.2511) (-0.5504) (-5.5284) (-0.6914) (-4.9981) 
           
Observations 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 
R-squared 0.0917 0.0758 0.0927 0.0760 0.0923 0.0759 0.0920 0.0758 0.0909 0.0756 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




To conduct this test, we include five proxies for the quality of enforcement suggested by La 
Porta et al. (1998) and their interactions with EPL index to our baseline model. Table 9 reports 
the results. Consistent with our baseline results, EPL index has negative effects on leverage 
SOA. More importantly, the coefficients on the triple interaction term among EPL index, 
enforcement measures, and the distance from target (EPL*ENFORCE*Dist) are negative and 
statistically significant in most models (except for columns (6) and (10)). These results imply 
that in countries where laws are well enforced, the negative impact of labour regulation 
stringency on leverage SOA is more pronounced. Our analysis further shows that, consistent 
with prior studies (Öztekin, 2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), the coefficients on the interaction 
term between enforcement measures and the distance from target (ENFORC*Dist) are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that firms operating in countries 
with better law enforcements have faster leverage adjustment. The results support our second 
hypothesis (H2). 
5. Further analyses 
In this section, we extend our analysis in several ways to provide further support to our main 
results. Specifically, we examine the impacts of employment protection legislation index of 
regular versus temporary workers on leverage SOA, and the confounding impacts of firms’ 
financial constraints on such associations. 
5.1. Employment protection legislation index of regular versus temporary workers and 
leverage adjustment 
As described in section 3.1.2, we measure the rigidity of a country’s labour market using a 
summary index based on the average of the sub-indicators for regular (EPR) and temporary 
workers (EPT). These legal regulations serve distinct groups of workers with distinct 




importance of each of the components of the overall EPL index for firms’ leverage adjustment, 
we re-estimate our baseline specification using EPL scores for temporary and regular workers 
separately. 
The results are reported in Table 10. The coefficients on the interaction term between EPL index 
for temporary workers and the distance from target (EPT*Dist) remain negative and highly 
significant at the 1 percent level, which implies that an increase in the stringency of labour 
regulation afforded to temporary workers tends to lower firms’ leverage SOA. However, the 
coefficients on the interaction term between EPL index for regular workers and the distance 
from target (EPR*Dist) are negative and statistically significant only for book leverage but are 
insignificant for market leverage. One plausible reason for such an ambiguous impact is that 
the use of temporary contracts costs firms more for labour turnover compared to regular 
contracts. As labour regulation affects firms’ financing decisions by increasing firms’ labour 
adjustment costs, the EPL index for temporary workers would affect firms’ leverage adjustment 




Table 10. Further analyses: Employment protection legislation index of regular versus 
temporary workers and leverage adjustment 
This table reports the regression results for the effect of EPL index for temporary and regular 
workers on the leverage speed of adjustment using the following models: 
                ∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +  𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1                         
The dependent variable is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is 
the different between the target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 is proxied 
by EPL index for temporary workers (models (1)-(2)) and for regular workers (models (3)-(4)) 
that are measured by OECD. Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ) including firm size (SIZE), 
tangibility (TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy (RDDUM), 
depreciation expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio 
(INDLEV), inflation rate (INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Year and country fixed effects 
are included in all models. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are bootstrapped. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The 
variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 









     
EPT*Dist -0.0181*** -0.0117***   
 (-7.5431) (-4.7960)   
EPR*Dist    -0.0234*** -0.0024 
   (-5.2481) (-0.4697) 
SIZE*Dist 0.0043*** 0.0021*** -0.0170*** -0.0097*** 
 (7.8747) (2.9785) (-8.4516) (-8.8891) 
TANG*Dist -0.0583*** -0.0078 -0.0498*** 0.0010 
 (-6.5013) (-0.9483) (-3.6370) (0.1019) 
PROF*Dist -0.0001 -0.0127 0.0557*** 0.0130 
 (-0.0062) (-0.7929) (2.8262) (1.5285) 
RD*Dist 0.0256 -0.2578*** -0.0843 -0.3179*** 
 (0.2631) (-3.3418) (-1.0106) (-4.2297) 
RDDUM*Dist -0.0073 0.0152*** 0.0003 0.0207*** 
 (-1.1667) (2.5772) (0.0849) (5.0512) 
DEP*Dist 0.4259*** 0.2251*** 0.1735* 0.0891 
 (6.0141) (3.3942) (1.7974) (0.6921) 
MTB*Dist 0.0000 -0.0015*** -0.0009 -0.0021** 
 (0.0170) (-3.5609) (-1.2823) (-2.5455) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.0853*** -0.0015 -0.1166*** -0.0142 
 (-4.5075) (-0.0838) (-3.8944) (-1.4123) 
INFL*Dist 1.8402*** 1.0135*** 1.4432*** 0.7666*** 
 (11.3651) (5.9113) (24.0671) (3.6937) 
GGDP*Dist 2.9870*** 2.6092*** 2.4035*** 2.3253*** 
 (24.3026) (14.2448) (15.3368) (21.0645) 
Constant -0.0034 -0.0261*** -0.0019 -0.0247*** 
 (-1.2257) (-12.7200) (-0.5699) (-9.2435) 
     
Observations 74,700 74,700 74,700 74,700 
R-squared 0.0872 0.0750 0.0922 0.0759 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 




5.2. EPLs and leverage adjustment: the impacts of financial constraints  
Our argument is that more stringent labour regulations lead to higher labour adjustment costs, 
a greater burden of fixed wage claims going forward, and higher operating leverage. This, in 
turn, increases firms’ asymmetric information and default risk, and thus, increases costs of 
leverage adjustments. This is even more of a concern for firms with greater financial constraints, 
as they find it harder to access the external capital markets.  
We examine this argument by using various proxies of financial constraints: cash flow deficit, 
dividend payout, and firm size. These proxies are among the most widely used in the literature 
to measure a firm’s ability to access external capital markets (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 
2004; Faulkender et al., 2012; Faulkender & Wang, 2006). To conduct the test, we include the 
interaction terms of EPLs and financial constraint measures into our baseline regressions (Eq. 
(6)). The results are reported in Table 11. We find that the coefficients of the interaction term 
EPL*Dist are negative and highly significant, indicating a consistently negative relationship 
between EPLs and leverage SOA as in our baseline results. More importantly, the coefficients 
on the triple interaction term among EPLs, financial constraint proxies, and the distance to 
target (EPL*FINCON*Dist) are negative and statistically significant across models. This result 
lends support to our argument that the negative impacts of EPLs on leverage SOA are more 




Table 11. Further analyses: Effects of financial constraints 
This table reports the regression results for the effects of financial constraints on the association between 
EPL index and leverage SOA: 
∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 =  (𝜑𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 +∧𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 + ∆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡  + 𝜌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) + 𝜗𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1 
The dependent variable is the change in book and market leverage ratio (∆ 𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡+1). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the different 
between the target leverage ratio and the actual leverage ratio. 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡  is proxied by EPL index measured by 
OECD. 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑗,𝑡 is firm’s financial constraints that are proxied by firm’s operating cash flow (columns 
(1)-(2)), dividend pay-out (columns (3)-(4)), and firm size (columns (5)-(6)). Control variables (vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) 
including firm size (SIZE), tangibility (TANG), profitability (PROF), R&D expenses (RD), R&D dummy 
(RDDUM), depreciation expenses (DEP), market-to-book ratio (MTB), industry median leverage ratio 
(INDLEV), inflation rate (INFL), and GDP growth rate (GGDP). Year and country fixed effects are included 
in all models. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are bootstrapped. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 













       
EPL*Dist -0.0279** -0.1023*** -0.0167*** -0.0171*** -0.0144*** -0.0131 
 (-2.0636) (-6.6199) (-3.0276) (-5.6662) (-3.1542) (-1.4455) 
EPL*FINCON*Dist -0.0262* -0.0440***     
 (-1.7238) (-3.3557)     
FINCON *Dist 0.0233* -0.0001     
 (1.8636) (-0.0048)     
EPL*DIVIDE*Dist   -0.0164*** -0.0125**   
   (-2.7521) (-2.5696)   
DIVIDE *Dist   0.1067*** 0.0484***   
   (31.6564) (8.1531)   
EPL*SMALL*Dist     -0.0105* -0.0037 
     (-1.8152) (-0.3551) 
SMALL *Dist     0.0603*** 0.0357*** 
     (15.7264) (4.7655) 
SIZE*Dist 0.0069*** -0.0005 0.0024*** 0.0015 0.0041*** 0.0020** 
 (7.0012) (-0.7788) (2.8476) (1.2944) (7.2190) (2.4288) 
TANG*Dist -0.0972*** -0.0383*** -0.0621*** -0.0028 -0.0537*** -0.0035 
 (-3.6028) (-2.6631) (-5.5145) (-0.3597) (-3.7364) (-0.3610) 
PROF*Dist 0.0136 0.0199 0.1002*** 0.0297*** 0.0230 -0.0011 
 (0.3072) (0.6682) (4.2595) (4.5216) (0.8167) (-0.0566) 
RD*Dist -0.0221 -0.3964*** -0.0768 -0.3003*** -0.0411 -0.3013*** 
 (-0.1209) (-8.5744) (-0.5268) (-8.7906) (-0.3222) (-3.2559) 
RDDUM*Dist 0.0051 0.0079 -0.0041 0.0166*** -0.0036 0.0182** 
 (0.4643) (0.7059) (-0.5206) (5.3830) (-0.5852) (2.5611) 
DEP*Dist 0.1671 0.1029 0.2117** 0.1300 0.2874*** 0.1395 
 (1.1267) (0.5199) (2.0228) (1.1833) (4.4377) (1.5189) 
MTB*Dist 0.0001 -0.0021*** -0.0005 -0.0021*** -0.0005 -0.0019*** 
 (0.0535) (-2.6621) (-0.7332) (-7.8856) (-0.7049) (-2.6359) 
INDLEV*Dist -0.1549*** -0.1118*** -0.0909*** -0.0097 -0.0967*** -0.0070 
 (-2.8088) (-5.0436) (-3.7578) (-0.3694) (-4.0838) (-0.4980) 
INFL*Dist 4.5709*** 1.2093* 1.8160*** 0.9511*** 1.6005*** 0.8483*** 
 (6.2903) (1.9376) (17.2272) (7.1071) (13.2728) (5.9576) 
GGDP*Dist 2.0753*** 2.7773*** 2.6364*** 2.5073*** 2.6420*** 2.3991*** 
 (5.2777) (3.5395) (13.1216) (12.2078) (16.7642) (17.1961) 
Constant 0.0128*** 0.0225*** -0.0004 -0.0243*** -0.0021 -0.0249*** 
 (3.0584) (8.1606) (-0.1220) (-6.1315) (-0.6080) (-8.9364) 
       
Observations 25,446 25,446 73,605 73,605 74,700 74,700 
R-squared 0.1061 0.0780 0.0944 0.0764 0.0898 0.0757 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 





In this paper, we study whether and how changes in the stringency of EPLs in a country affects 
firms’ leverage adjustment speed. Since recent literature suggests evidence of both positive and 
negative sides of the EPLs’ stringency, the association between EPLs and leverage SOA is a 
priori ambiguous. Using intertemporal variation in the EPL index across 19 OECD countries 
between 1985 and 2007, we find strong empirical evidence that increases with the strictness of 
labour regulation reducing firms’ leverage SOA. Our results are robust to alternative measures 
of labour regulation stringency, alternative measures of leverage, and alternative subsamples. 
Additionally, we address the endogeneity issues by using an IV approach, analysing cross-
sectional heterogeneity, and adding additional control variables. Our findings remain valid in 
such analyses.  
Furthermore, since previous literature shows that employment regulations are not fully enforced 
in countries with inefficient legal systems, we consider the impact of the effectiveness of a 
country’s legal enforcement on the association between EPLs and leverage SOA. Using five 
proxies for the quality of enforcement suggested by La Porta et al. (1998), we find that in 
countries with effective legal enforcement, the negative impact of EPLs on corporate leverage 
SOA is more pronounced. We then extend our analyses in several ways to provide further 
empirical support. We find that the strictness of labour regulation afforded to temporary 
workers is also negatively associated with leverage SOA, whereas the effect of EPL index for 
regular workers on leverage SOA is relatively weaker. Further analysis on the impacts on 
financial constraints suggests that firms that find it harder to access the external capital markets 





Overall, our study highlights that the stringency of a country’s labour protection laws is an 
important determinant in shaping firms’ optimal capital structure decisions. Our evidence 
supports a negative, rather than positive, view of EPLs and thus contributes to an essential and 
timely debate on the pros and cons of a country’s policies related to employment protection in 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variables Acronym Description Data source 
A. Firm-level variable     
A.1. Leverage  LEV     
Book leverage BLEV Book value of total debt divided by book 
value of total assets 
Worldscope 
Market leverage MLEV Book value of total debt divided by the sum 
of market value of equity and the book value 
of total debt 
Worldscope 
Active leverage ALEV Book value of total debt divided by the sum 
book value of total assets and the total net 
income 
Worldscope 
A2. EPL variables     
EPL index by 
OECD 
EPL Employment protection legislation index 
ranging from 0 to 6 
OECD 
EPR index EPR Sub-indicator employment protection 
legislation index for regular workers ranging 
from 0 to 6 
OECD 
EPT index EPT Sub-indicator employment protection 
legislation index for temporary workers 
ranging from 0 to 6 
OECD 
EPL index by 
Allard (2005) 
EPLA Employment protection legislation index 
developed by Allard (2005) that extend the 





CRLI This index comprises collective relation’s 
laws that protect employees through 
collective action 




SSLI This index reflects pensions, sickness and 
healthcare coverage, and unemployment 
covering of employees 




ELI This index addresses the incremental cost to 
firms if they deviate from a rigid contract in 
which the conditions of employment are 
specified for all employees and no employee 
can be fired 







UNEC This index provides information on the 
generosity of unemployment benefits 
Aleksynska and 
Schindler (2011) 
A3. Target leverage variables     
Distance from 
Target 
Dist Difference between target and observed 
leverage ratio 
Self-calculated 
A4. Other firm-level 
characteristics 
    
Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of book value of total 
assets 
Worldscope 
Tangibility TANG Net property, plant and equipment dividend 




MTB Ratio of book value of assets less book value 
of equity plus market value of equity to book 
value of assets 
Worldscope 
Profitability PROF Earning before interests, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization divided by book value of 
assets 
Worldscope 
Depreciation DEP Depreciation and amortization divided by 




RD Research and development expenses divided 





RDDUM Dummy variable that equals to one if 
research and development expenses are not 




CASHFLOW A dummy that equals one if the firm has a 




DIVIDE A dummy that equals one if the firm pay 
dividend in a given year and zero otherwise 
Worldscope 
B. Industry-level variable     
Industry median 
of leverage 
INDMED The median leverage ratio of an industry to 
















   
GDP growth 
rate 
GGDP Annual GDP growth rate. World 
Development 
Indicator 
Inflation rate INFL Annual inflation rate World 
Development 
Indicator 
   
Efficiency of 
judicial system 
EFFJUD Measures the efficiency and integrity of the 
country’s legal environment. The index is 
scaled from zero to 10; with lower scores, 
lower efficiency levels. 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Rule of law RULLAW Measures the law and order tradition in the 
country. The index is scaled from zero to 10, 
with lower scores for less tradition for law 
and order. 




CORRUP Measures the corruption level of the 
government in the country. The index is 
scale from zero to 10, with lower scores for 
lower level of corruption. 




RISEXP Measures the risk of ‘‘outright 
confiscation’’ or ‘‘forced nationalization’’. 
The index is scaled from zero to 10, with 
lower scores for higher risks. 






RISCON Measures the ‘‘risk of a modification in a 
contract taking the form of a repudiation, 
postponement, or scaling down’’ due to 
‘‘budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a 
change in government, or a change in 
government economic and social 
priorities’’. The index is scaled from zero to 
10, with lower scores for higher risks. 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
English origin ENGORI Dummy variable equal to unity if the firm 
operates under English law, and zero 
otherwise. 







CREDITOR A score of one is assigned when each of the 
following rights of secured lenders is 
defined in laws and regulations: First, there 
are restrictions, such as creditor consent or 
minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for 
reorganization. Second, secured creditors 
are able to seize their collateral after the 
reorganization petition is approved. Third, 
secured creditors are paid first from the 
proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm, as 
opposed to other creditors such as 
government or workers. Finally, if 
management does not retain administration 
of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization. The index ranges from zero 
(weak creditor rights) to four (strong creditor 
rights) 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Tax shields TAX First-year effective tax rate (percent). The 
tax rate obtained by dividing the total 























Summary and Conclusion 
 
The thesis includes three essays that investigate several determinants of the speed at which 
firms adjust their leverage to target ratios:  liquidity – a financial firm-level factor, corporate 
sustainability performance – a non-financial firm-level factor, and employment protection laws 
– a country-level factor. 
The two papers in the second chapter of this thesis examine the association between liquidity 
and leverage SOA using data from the UK market and international contexts, respectively. 
These two papers highlight the important role of equity liquidity in determining the speed at 
which firms move toward to the target leverage ratios, and how this association is affected by 
the position of actual leverage relative to target leverage, the target’s stability, and country’s 
institutional environments. The third chapter answers the question of how, and the extent to 
which corporate sustainability performance affects leverage SOA. The fourth chapter reveals 
the link between employment protection laws and speed of leverage adjustments, and how this 
association is conditional on the effectiveness of country’s legal system. 
The main findings from this thesis are: 
(i) Equity liquidity has positive and significant impact on the speed at which firms 
adjust back to their target leverage ratios; 
(ii) Equity liquidity only has a positive impact on the SOA of over-levered firms and 
this impact is moderated in countries with bankruptcy codes but has no significant 




(iii) The positive relationship between liquidity and SOA is more pronounced for firms 
whose current position is relatively close to their target leverage ratio and whose 
target ratio is relatively stable; 
(iv) The positive liquidity - leverage SOA relationship is less pronounced for 
firms in strong institutional environments and more pronounced for firms in weak 
institutional environments; 
(v) Firms with superior CSP tend to adjust faster toward their target leverage ratios. 
(vi) There are four mechanisms through which CSP positively affects the speed of 
leverage adjustments: information asymmetry, equity mispricing, stakeholder 
engagements, and competitive advantages; 
(vii) The positive association between CSP and leverage adjustment speed is less 
pronounced in countries with high-quality institutions; 
(viii) An increase in the stringency of EPLs significantly decreases leverage adjustment 
speeds; and 
(ix) The response of leverage adjustment to changes in EPLs is more pronounced in 
countries with effective legal enforcement. 
The details of these findings are set out in Sections 5.1 to 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the 
contributions and implications of the thesis’s findings. Section 5.5 describes the limitations of 
this research and suggests future research areas. 
5.1. Main findings of Chapter 2 
Despite the evidence that equity liquidity and the speed at which firms adjust toward their target 
leverage are related, and despite the theoretical prediction among them, how liquidity 
determines firms’ leverage SOA is largely unknown to us. Chapter 2 investigates this 
association through two papers. The first paper, “Liquidity and dynamic leverage adjustments: 




their target leverage using the UK data. Though several studies have examined the capital 
structure choices of UK firms (Bennett & Donnelly, 1993; Bevan & Danbolt, 2002, 2004; Dang, 
2013), they do not investigate the dynamic leverage adjustments. Although, there are some 
studies investigating leverage adjustments in the US (Devos et al., 2017; Faulkender et al., 
2012; Warr et al., 2012), it is unclear whether US findings in dynamic capital structure research 
are sample-specific and driven by institutional characteristics of the US market. This study adds 
to the empirical literature on the analysis of the dynamic leverage adjustments in the UK market. 
Whilst prior studies have well documented the association between liquidity and firms’ static 
capital structure (e.g., Lipson & Mortal, 2009), there has been no prior research that investigates 
the crucial role of equity liquidity in determining corporate dynamic leverage adjustments. 
Previous literature suggests that highly liquid firms have lower financial transaction costs, 
which is the main part of leverage adjustment costs (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). 
Additionally, high liquidity helps firms to reduce issuing costs of both equity and debt financing 
(Butler et al., 2005; Cheung et al., 2019; Hennessy & Whited, 2005). This paper provides 
evidence that firm-level liquidity impacts both capital structure (Lipson & Mortal, 2009) and 
leverage adjustment speed. 
Further analyses show that liquidity only has a positive effect on the SOA of over-levered firms 
but has no significant effect on that of under-levered firms. The reason is over-levered firms 
are most likely to raise equity to correct the imbalance and they are even more motivated to do 
so if they enjoy high equity liquidity. Under-levered firms are most likely to correct the 
imbalance by issuing debt, which is relatively unaffected by the state of the liquidity of its 
equity. The paper further highlights an interactive association among liquidity, leverage 
deviation, target instability, and leverage SOA: the positive relationship between a firm’s 
liquidity and leverage SOA is more pronounced for firms which deviate less from target 




The second paper presented in Chapter 2 “Liquidity and speed of leverage adjustment” 
examines the relationship between liquidity and leverage SOA using an international sample of 
35 countries. The paper confirms that high firm-level liquidity not only reduces equity financing 
costs, but also improves corporate governance, which results in lower costs of leverage 
adjustment. This finding is consistent with the previous literature on micro-finance (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986; Chang et al., 2014; Dang et al., 2015; Liao, Mukherjee, & Wang, 2015; 
Lipson & Mortal, 2009; Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002).  
Secondly, consistent with the previous paper, this study shows that liquidity only has a 
significantly positive impact on the leverage SOA of over-levered firms. For under-levered 
firms, however, the association is ambiguous. Especially as due to the high level of debt, the 
threat of bankruptcy is generally more severe for over-levered firms. In adjusting to target 
leverage, over-levered firms substitute equity for debt and decrease their threat of bankruptcy. 
This paper finds that in countries with explicit bankruptcy codes, the threat of bankruptcy of 
over-levered firms is less severe, which leads to the impacts of liquidity on leverage SOA for 
over-levered firms being moderated. 
Thirdly, this paper suggests that strong institutional environments, proxied by the strength of 
law and order, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation by government, level of 
corruption (La Porta et al., 1998), creditor rights enforcement (Djankov et al., 2003), and the 
significance of the banking sector (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1996) tend to attenuate the 
positive association between liquidity and leverage SOA. 
5.2. Main findings of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 consists of one research paper “The effect of corporate sustainability performance on 




the potential underlying economic mechanisms of this association, and the impact of a country’s 
institutional environments on this association. 
Previous literature shows that CSP has a potential to enhance firms’ value by improving 
financial performance through lowering the idiosyncratic financial constraints (Cheng et al., 
2014), reducing firms risk (Sassen et al., 2016), and sinking the costs of capital (Bae et al., 2019; 
El Ghoul et al., 2018; Goss & Roberts, 2011). This paper contributes to the literature by 
providing empirical evidence on a new mechanism through which CSP leads to corporate value 
creation that is increasing the speed with which firms adjust their leverage toward the target 
ratios and predisposes them to operate at the optimal level of leverage that balances the benefits 
against the costs of debt financing. To test the hypotheses, this paper employs a cross-country 
panel dataset from the Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg databases for 2,869 publicly listed 
firms from 31 countries for the period between 2002 and 2018. 
The results show that CSP has a positive and significant association with the speed of leverage 
adjustments toward the target. Since previous literature recommends that CSP can lower firm 
risks, reduce costs of capital, improve information transparency, enhance stakeholder 
engagements, and generate competitive advantages (Breuer et al., 2018; Cao et al., 2019; Cho 
et al., 2013; Choi & Wang, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2018; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Goss & Roberts, 
2011; Sassen et al., 2016), firms with superior CSP have lower leverage adjustment costs, and 
thus, faster adjustment speeds. The robustness of the results are confirmed by using a wide 
range of tests: alternative control variables, substituting leverage and target leverage with 
alternative measures, alternative econometric method, and re-estimating the baseline model 
with different subsamples. To mitigate potential endogeneity and correlated omitted variables 
concerns, the instrument variable approach that employs the two-stage feasible efficient 
generalized method of moment’s estimation with validity-tested instruments is applied. The 




In further analysis, the paper investigates four mechanisms through which CSP positively 
affects the leverage SOA and finds that information asymmetry, equity mispricing, stakeholder 
engagements, and competitive advantages significantly determine this association. The paper 
also indicates that strong institutional environments attenuate the positive association between 
CSP and leverage SOA. This result is consistent with the view that institutional settings are an 
external and less costly mechanism that firms could employ to reduce asymmetric information 
and enhance stakeholder engagements, thus, speeding up their leverage adjustment (An et al., 
2015; Çolak et al., 2018; Öztekin, 2015; Öztekin & Flannery, 2012).  
5.3. Main findings of Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 consists of one research paper titled “OECD labour protection and dynamic leverage 
adjustments”. This paper examines the crucial role of a country-level factor, EPL, in 
determining the speed at which firms adjust to their target ratio. Prior literature has examined 
the impacts of several macro-level determinants of leverage SOA such as macroeconomic 
conditions (Cook & Tang, 2010), institutional arrangements (Öztekin & Flannery, 2012), and 
political uncertainty (Çolak et al., 2018). Labour is a key factor of production that affects many 
aspects of corporate performance (Acharya et al., 2013, 2014; Cui et al., 2018; Karpuz et al., 
2020). To date, however, the literature has largely ignored the importance of the legal 
framework related to employees – a nonfinancial element, in determining leverage adjustments. 
To test the hypotheses, the paper uses the EPL index developed by the OECD for its member 
countries during the 1985-2007 period. The baseline results suggest that firms operating in the 
countries with more stringent labour protection more slowly adjust to their target leverage. The 
results are robust when using alternative measures of EPLs (Aleksynska & Schindler, 2011; 
Allard, 2005; Botero et al., 2004), alternative measures of leverage, and alternative subsamples 
of countries and firms. To address the endogeneity issues, the paper uses three approaches: 




et al., 2004); examining the different effects of labour regulation’s stringency across industries 
with different labour adjustment characteristics (Rajan & Zingales, 1998); and controlling for 
additional variables to capture potential confounding impacts that may be biasing the results. 
Overall, results from these tests jointly specify that main finding of the paper is unlikely to be 
driven by the potential endogeneity issues. 
The paper next investigates the influence of the effectiveness of a country’s legal enforcement 
on the relationship between EPLs and leverage SOA. As labour regulations have weak 
compliance and are not fully enforced in countries with weak legal systems (Rutkowski & 
Scarpetta, 2005), the leverage SOA is less sensitive to changes in labour laws in such countries. 
Extending the analyses, the paper further shows that an increase in the stringency of labour 
regulation afforded to temporary workers tends to lower firms’ leverage SOA while the impact 
of EPL index for regular workers on leverage SOA is relatively weaker. Moreover, more 
stringent EPLs decreases the leverage SPA more severely for firms with greater financial 
constraints, as they find it harder to access the external capital markets.  
5.4. Contributions and Implications 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Overall, by using dynamic partial 
adjustment models of capital structure, this thesis introduces new determinants of leverage SOA 
including a financial firm-level factor – equity liquidity; a non-financial firm-level factor – CSP; 
and a country-level factor – EPL. Consistent with the extant empirical literature on dynamic 
capital structure adjustments, we contribute to the growing literature on the determinants of the 
leverage SOA (An et al., 2015; Çolak et al., 2018; Devos et al., 2017; Faulkender et al., 2012; 
Öztekin & Flannery, 2012). In detail, Chapter 2 of the thesis adds to recent research on the 
relationship between the sensitivity of cost of equity on leverage deviation and leverage SOA 
(Zhou et al., 2016) to show that firm-level liquidity affects both capital structure (Lipson & 




levered firms. The chapter also contributes to the empirical literature on the association between 
equity liquidity and firms’ capital structure decisions in the UK market. Although several 
studies have examined the capital structure choices of UK firms (Bennett & Donnelly, 1993; 
Bevan & Danbolt, 2002, 2004; Dang, 2013), the dynamic leverage adjustments have not been 
examined. The thesis thus fills this important gap in the literature by examining dynamic 
leverage adjustments in the UK. This chapter further contributes to the empirical literature on 
the joint relationship among equity liquidity, leverage deviation, target stability and leverage 
SOA, given that there is theoretical and empirical evidence that these elements are associated. 
By using an international sample, Chapter 2 examines how country-level environments affect 
the sensitivity of leverage SOA to liquidity, hence contributing to the extant literature on the 
impacts of macro-level institutional environments on corporate capital structure decisions and 
aggregate financial markets.  
Chapter 3 introduces a new non-financial essential element, corporate sustainability 
performance, which explains the cross-sectional variation of leverage SOA. The chapter further 
explores the potential underlying economic channels and identifies four mechanisms that 
explain the association between CSP and leverage adjustment speeds: information asymmetry, 
equity mispricing, stakeholder engagements, and competitive advantages. This chapter 
highlights the impact of institutional settings on capital structure that strong institutional 
settings are a substitute for CSP that mitigates the positive association between CSP and 
leverage SOA. Finally, Chapter 4 contributes to a growing literature that explores the important 
role of labour market mechanisms on various corporate decisions, specifically, the significant 
role played by a country’s labour protection in determining firms’ optimal capital structure 
decisions. The study also adds to the large body of research on dynamic capital structure by 
showing that labour protection laws are a new and important element that firms take into 




This study has several implications. Firstly, corporate’s managers may improve equity liquidity 
and/or invest more on sustainability activities at the firm-level to increase the speed of leverage 
adjustment, thus enhancing a firm’s value. However, to the extent that such activities are costly, 
in financial and opportunity costs, these need to be traded off against the benefits of increasing 
leverage SOA. The thesis’s findings have important implications for corporate strategic 
planning on the privately optimal levels of CSP and liquidity activities.  
From a policy perspective, our findings speak to the importance of equity liquidity and CSP 
investments in a firm’s financing performance. Governments and authorities should consider 
using regulations to encourage firms to improve their liquidity, as well as environmental, social, 
and corporate governance performance, and create good-quality institutional settings. 
Additionally, countries may use regulations on labour protection laws to shape firms’ optimal 
capital structure decisions. They may also strengthen their institutional environments to 
enhance the impacts of equity liquidity, CSP, and EPL on firms’ leverage SOA.  
5.5. Limitations and directions for future research 
The static trade-off theory of capital structure suggests that a corporate can maximize its value 
by operating at a target leverage level that balances the benefits and costs of debt financing. 
The dynamic trade-off view predicts that when firms deviate from their target levels, they will 
make adjustments to move back to the target (Fischer et al., 1989; Goldstein, Ju, & Leland, 
2001; Leary & Roberts, 2005). However, due to financing frictions, this adjustment can involve 
nontrivial costs, making the capital structure adjustment dynamic in nature and the SOA 
unexpectedly slow. This thesis investigates three new firm-level and macro-level determinants 
that impact firm’s speed of leverage adjustments. Given the importance of corporate capital 
structure’s decision, future research could reveal more determinants that potentially affects the 




Additionally, the thesis examines the determinants of leverage SOA using an international 
context. Evidence shows that different countries are distinct in trading mechanisms and 
sustainability concerns, resulting in different levels of stock liquidity and sustainable 
investments (Brown & Zhang, 1997). It is, therefore, interesting to discover how stock liquidity 
and CSP affect dynamic leverage adjustments in different markets. In the future, study could 
focus on a single market in the different stock trading mechanisms such as pure order-driven 
(e.g., Australia), quote-driven (e.g., US), developed, or emerging markets to have a comparison 
among these distinct markets. Moreover, the observation is that findings from the thesis suggest 
that firms in an under-levered position display only a weak propensity to move back to their 
target ratios. Another important topic for future analysis would involve a closer examination of 
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